

Wilberforce Quarterly

Strategic Analysis of Terrorism and Global Security

Center for Defense and Security Policy Wilberforce University Fall 2008

IN THIS ISSUE:

PROLIFERATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND STABILITY: NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTH ASIA

By Alethia H. Cook and Anjali Sahay.....1

ISLAM, JIHADISM AND DEPOLITICIZATION IN FRANCE AND GERMANY

By Anouar Boukhars.....10

THE NEW DISARMAMENT DISCUSSION

By Sharon Squassoni.....22



Display of Pakistani missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

Wilberforce Quarterly seeks to publish thoughtful analysis and balanced information on a broad range of security and strategic issues confronting the United States and its allies. The journal's goal is to satisfy the need for independent research on important security issues and generate scholarly discussion and greater public awareness of the changing patterns of international relations. The journal was founded, by Anouar Boukhars, Director of the Wilberforce Centre for Defense and Security Policy, thanks to an NNSA funded grant ID DEFG02-05 CH1131. The opinions expressed within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Wilberforce University.

PROLIFERATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND STABILITY: NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTH ASIA

By Alethia H. Cook and Anjali Sahay

Abstract

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs impact South Asia in many ways as well as being influenced by the characteristics of those states. Political stability, terrorism threats, and economic development continue to be impacted by the presence of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the stability of the region itself is impacted by political instability and the presence of terrorists in these nuclear weapons powers. These issues will be examined at length in this paper. It will conclude with US foreign policy alternatives for the region.

Introduction

South Asia has always been of strategic importance to the US. Today is no exception. In fact the region could arguably be seen as more important to US in the current environment than previously. "The United States is intensely concerned about Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir becoming a giant 'safe house' for terrorism, the possibility of Indian and especially Pakistani nuclear materials falling into the wrong hands, and the possibility of a nuclear war between the two enduring

rivals.” (Sathasivam 2005, p. 141) The US has valued the assistance of the Pakistanis in the conduct of the Global War on Terrorism. At the same time, US economic ties with India have expanded as more and more US foreign direct investment has headed to that country.

At present, the United States is concerned about the continued ‘cross-border-infiltration’ of Islamic militants traversing the Kashmiri Line-of-Control to engage in terrorist acts in India and Indian-Occupied-Kashmir. Although the United States welcomes the economic development of India, it remains opposed to the Indian nuclear weapons program. The United States is assisting India in three key areas: economics; security, in particular counter-terrorism; and meeting its energy needs through a joint nuclear technology deal.

Meanwhile, Pakistan is facing domestic challenges arising from religious extremism and political unrest. Relations between the US and Pakistan have been uncertain at best, based on the US perception of its geostrategic interests. Throughout the Cold War, the US courted Pakistan but failed to exhibit commitment to improving or sustaining relations with the country. The relationship has therefore been characterized by varying periods of cooperation and suspicion. The United States has several concerns about Pakistan that may serve to either strengthen or undermine the relationship, depending on how they are handled on both sides. These include: terrorism; the stability of Pakistan’s neighbors; the ongoing Kashmir problem and tensions with India; Pakistani governmental stability and democratization; the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons; and the potential for Pakistan’s continuation of nuclear proliferation activities. (modified from K. A. Kronstadt 2008, p. 1)

There are many important ways that the nuclear arms situation in South Asia differs from the Cold War arms race between the US and Russia. First of all, India and Pakistan share a long and contentious border. The relative proximity of these competitors has brought them into almost constant conflict and creates the potential for conventional war and fear of escalation to nuclear war. Second, there is a major religious component to relationship between India and Pakistan. The creation of Pakistan itself was based on the separation of Hindus and Muslims. Third, India and Pakistan suffer from major poverty problems. Both countries have prioritized defense and the development of their nuclear weapons programs over economic stability, infrastructure improvement, and deal

ing with domestic poverty. Fourth, India and Pakistan have limited nuclear arsenals and limited second-strike capability. (One author argued that India had a second strike capability, but this was challenged by many others. (W. Sindhu 1998)) There is no mutually assured destruction to check the competitors’ desires to utilize their nuclear weapons. Finally, the continued influence of the US and Russia on the dynamics of the relationship between India and Pakistan creates unique pressures. Where the US and Russia were free to conduct their conflict without interference, Pakistan and India have had to accommodate the wishes of the superpowers and their wavering commitment. These important differences between the Cold War nuclear rivalry and that between India and Pakistan mean that the arguments and policies that prevented nuclear conflict before may have no impact today.

The stability/instability paradox (an argument that nuclear weapons make it less likely that a conventional conflict will escalate to all-out war—thereby making small scale conventional conflict itself more likely) was applicable in the Cold War conflict but may not apply in this case. What has been seen recently is Pakistani limited aggression with a relative lack of response from India. Kapur argues that “a full scale Indo-Pakistani conventional conflict would create a significant risk of nuclear escalation. This danger enables Pakistan to launch limited attacks on India while deterring all-out Indian conventional retaliation...” (Kapur 2005) The presence of nuclear weapons on the Indian subcontinent has, therefore, increased the instability of the region rather than making it more stable as some would anticipate.

P.R. Chari applied this argument to the 2001-2002 Kargil border conflict between India and Pakistan. He stated that “The availability of the nuclear deterrent to Pakistan encouraged its undertaking the Kargil intrusions, and exponentially increasing its cross-border terrorism and proxy war in Kashmir.” (Chari 2004, p. 25) Reports indicate that during the Kargil conflict Pakistan mobilized some of its nuclear forces in an overt nuclear threat to India. This information is contentious. (Chari 2004, p. 25) However, the mere fact that such news was generated out of the conflict is cause for concern about regional stability. Furthermore, there were direct threats made by members of Pakistani government. Pakistan’s foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad warned, “We will not hesitate to use any weapons in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity.” (Ahmed 2004) At issue here is the conventional disadvantage the Pakistanis continue to ex

perience versus the Indian military. This could stimulate the Pakistanis to be both aggressive and prone to escalation to compensate for its inferior capabilities.

This paper examines both India and Pakistan on four key characteristics: conventional weapons; political stability; nuclear weapons issues; and terrorism. These were deemed to be important factors for the stability of the region. The paper focuses on the key differences across these characteristics between India and Pakistan and their impact on relations with the US. The conclusions provide comparisons and recommendations for US policy when dealing with the countries and the region.

Conventional Imbalance

Since nuclear postures and interactions are shaped by perceptions of threat that are fundamentally political in nature, analyzing political stability in forecasting nuclear future takes precedence. As explained by Cohen, political stability as a variable affects nuclear futures in two ways. (Cohen 2003, p. 12) First, there is a question of who controls the nuclear weapons. A state driven by military coups and conflicts may not be in complete control over its arsenal and fissile material stockpile. Second, the perception of political instability in a neighboring rival state can heighten tensions in one’s own.

Pakistan is conventionally weaker than India on all fronts. Its security strategies have been preoccupied by the threat posed to it by India and by the persistent conflict over the Jammu and Kahsmir region. This is one of the major reasons for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program—a hope to level the playing field with a conventionally superior foe.

Table 1 summarizes the gaps between the Indian strategic situation and that of Pakistan. In spite of its significant poverty problem, Pakistan and India have made substantial commitments to maintaining their military forces. However, in each category of weaponry and capacity (as exemplified by the admittedly minimal listing on Table 1), the Indian military capacity exceeds that of Pakistan.

The presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia has raised new concerns in Washington policy circles. “George Bush has singled out terrorist nuclear attacks on the United States as a defining threat in the foreseeable future.” (Allison 2004, p. 1)

Table 1. Strategic Comparison of India and Pakistan, 2007 (1)

Category	India	Pakistan
GDP (US\$)	1,209 billion	144 billion
GDP per capita (US\$)	1,070	849
Defense Expenditures (US\$)	22.4 billion	4.14 billion
Population	1,129,866,154	169,270,617
Defense Expenditures as % of GDP	1.85%	2.87%
Active Military Forces	1,288,000	619,000
Main Battle Tanks	4,059	2,461
Frigates	15	6
Combat Capable Aircraft (Air Force)	565	360
Nuclear Warheads Estimate	Up to 100	Up to 60

As India continues to reinvent itself politically and economically, leaders and policymakers, economists, academicians and the global community at large, remain concerned about the country’s nuclear ambitions. As a country leading in both proliferation and poverty, observers are critical about India’s growth potential with military and nuclear ambitions on the rise.

Nuclear Weapons Programs

The control of nuclear weapons program in India has been fairly consistent and stable as compared Pakistan and can be attributed largely to the stability of its leadership since independence. The Congress government led by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru remained committed to developing the nuclear weapons program since its inception. Except for the brief tenure of the Janata Party government 1977-79 (when the nuclear weapons program was put on hold), the weapons program continued under the leadership of Indira Gandhi and acquired enormous capability to deliver nuclear weapons by 1996. (2)

The Bhartiya Janata Party (the Hindu Nationalist Party) conducted nuclear tests in May 1998 and declared that it would build a ‘credible minimum deterrent.’ The Indian government also formally articulated a nuclear doctrine

of 'no first use.' This act was consistent with the "proliferationists who favor the spread of nuclear weapons because it enhances international or regional security." (Schneider 1994, p. 210)

In the case of India, the escalation of the nuclear weapons program can be largely attributed to nuclear tensions with China followed by those with Pakistan. After India's defeat in the war with China in 1962 and nuclear tests by China in 1964, India authorized theoretical work on the Subterranean Nuclear Explosion for Peaceful Purposes (SNEPP) that eventually culminated in nuclear tests in May 1974. Since then, the pace of re-engagement between the two Asian giants has sped up. "In a series of initiatives, the two have agreed to reduce the level of troops on the border, to delineate the line of control, open up cross-border trade, and build confidence through a series of high level military and civilian visits." (Gordon 1995, p. 880) Close links of nuclear technology exchanged between China and Pakistan became a bigger concern for India.

The nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan needs to be analyzed in the backdrop of Indo-Pakistani relations, particularly their continuing dispute over Kashmir. Although India initially tested its nuclear weapons as a reaction to the threat posed by China, Pakistani leaders grew increasingly alarmed at the prospect of India developing a nuclear weapons capability. As the larger power with more developed defense-industrial base, India also received technology from both Russia and the United States. (See, for example, Thomas 1990) As a result, Islamabad clung more tenaciously to its nuclear weapons program and brought about the notion of a nuclear 'equalizer' to India.

Pakistan's recent political turmoil has brought the security of its nuclear assets into question. Musharraf has attempted to assure the world that his country's nuclear arsenal is secure, but concerns continue

Pakistan's nuclear weapons program began in the mid-1970s. In 1984, A. Q. Khan informed the world, by way of the Pakistani press, that he had succeeded in enriching Uranium to weapons-grade. In 1987, Khan again spoke out and declared that Pakistan had developed a nuclear weapon manufacturing capability. (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2007, p. 94) Finally, in May of 1998 in response to Indian nuclear detonations, Pakistan demonstrated its nuclear weapons capacity in a series of

tests. The proof of the nuclear weapons capacities of India and Pakistan at this point came as no surprise to the international community. (Talbot 1999, p. 117) Estimates of the current Pakistani nuclear arsenal vary. They continue to produce weapons-grade materials at a level sufficient to produce about 5 additional warheads per year. (Kerr and Nikitin 2008, p. 2)

Pakistan does not have a formal nuclear weapons doctrine. Their declared position is to develop and maintain a "minimum credible nuclear deterrence." (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2007, p. 37) There is not, however, a quantity of nuclear weapons that has been determined to give the country this capacity. Their nuclear weapons program is designed to: deter external aggression; deter using both conventional and strategic forces; deter counterforce strategies with the threat of nuclear retaliation; and stabilize strategic deterrence in South Asia. (Kerr and Nikitin 2008, p. 4)

P.R. Chari argued that India's pursuit of its military nuclear option was largely influenced by powerful domestic and personal factors that also led to the rejection of entry into the CTBT. (P. R. Chari 2004) Despite the perception that it raises India's security, the growth of nuclear arsenals creates misperceptions and instability in at least five different ways for India. These are: (1) creating the need to establish survivable nuclear forces; (2) starting a three-way arms race to balance with both China and Pakistan; (3) ensuring the survivability of the small deterrent force from external attack and internal sabotage; (4) needing to pursue counter-city or counterforce strategy; and (5) ensuring against nuclear accidents. (P. Chari 2004, pp.30-31)

Since the development of nuclear weapons program in both countries, the South Asian security environment has been dramatically altered. The Kargil conflict in 1999 and the subsequent border crisis made it clear that the presence of nuclear weapons did not remove the danger of war, but rather "increased the stakes if war occurred." (Krepon 2004, p. 19) In fact, "the tit-for-tat nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 had probably succeeded in making the Kargil conflict possible and providing the umbrella under which their border confrontation could proceed to reach critical levels." (Krepon 2004, p. 25)

Proliferation and Terrorism

Nuclear weapons pose a particularly destructive threat for India, a country that has nuclear weapons and remains exposed to the threat of terrorists acquiring and using them in future. As noted by former Senator and current co-Chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative Sam Nunn, “if terrorists are seeking nuclear weapons then there can be little doubt that if they acquire a weapon, they will use it.” (Nunn 2007) The possibility of terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons or relevant materials and knowledge has led to renewed ties with the United States in the form of counter-terrorism cooperation and is in fact “one facet of the emerging strategic partnership with the United States.” (Kronstadt 2005, p. 43)

Terrorist groups based out of Kashmir and having links with Pakistan are a concern for India. Several of these anti-India militant groups (Harakat ul – Mujahideen, Hizbul Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Lashkar-e-Taiba) (3) maintain ties with international jihad organizations, including al Qaeda. The December 2001 attacks on the Indian Parliament claimed by both Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba groups provided an additional wake-up call for India to the threat of catastrophic terrorism. The ten-month military standoff between India and Pakistan also brought up the possibility of these groups providing materials and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons or “dirty bombs” to al Qaeda. (4)

Additionally, if Islamabad were to lose control over its nuclear arsenal to terrorist groups, ‘loose nukes’ would mobilize New Delhi’s security, causing massive deployment. However, “such a deterrent would have little or no effect on rogue actors that might threaten the use of nuclear weapons.” (Tellis 2006, p. 16) Moreover, the source material for nuclear terrorism could come from illicit transactions of poorly protected materials originating outside the region, as well as material from within the region, used for military or civilian purposes. This has caused established regulatory bodies and agencies within India to increase the safety and security of their nuclear materials against threats by terrorist groups.

The terrorist concern relevant to Pakistan is two-fold: the potential for it to intentionally proliferate to non-state actors and the concern over it losing control of its nuclear arsenal to groups within the country. As it developed a nuclear weapons capacity, the Pakistani program also began a major proliferation network. A. Q. Khan and those working with him shifted their focus from building their own bombs to facilitating programs in other

countries as their capacities grew. The extent to which the Pakistani government was complicit in this network will likely never be known. What is clear is that the program proliferated enrichment technology, equipment, weapons designs and materials to Iran, Libya, North Korea, and others. According to Congressional testimony, the network trafficked in all aspects of nuclear weaponry with the exception of a full-up nuclear device. (Fitzpatrick 2007)

After 9/11, the US offered Pakistan assistance in ensuring its nuclear safety and security. Pakistan was reluctant, but sent a team to assess the US offer. Pakistan ultimately put conditions on the receipt of US aid, including: it would not accept US intrusions; Pakistan would select the technologies it wanted to receive; and end-user certificates would be signed by the Pakistani Strategic Plans Division so that the US would not know the final location of the equipment. The US has trained officers, technicians and engineers on nuclear safety and security issues. (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2007, p. 114)

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons safety and security measures are improving. They have traditionally secured them by storing the weapons in a disassembled form as well as utilizing authorization codes for access. They have also expressed interest in the development of permissive action link systems and environmental sensing devices (which hinder detonation unless certain environmental conditions, such as those experienced in a missile launch, are met) to increase security. (Kerr and Nikitin 2008, p. 6; International Institute for Strategic Studies 2007, p. 115)

Pakistani instability was exacerbated in 2007. The troubles began to be publicly recognized when in March of 2007, Musharraf dismissed the country’s Chief Justice on charges of nepotism and misconduct. (K. A. Kronstadt 2008, p. 4) The move was widely believed to have been an attempt on the part of Musharraf to dispose of his political rivals. On November 3, 2007, Musharraf suspended the elected government in what some refer to as his “second coup”—with the first being his bloodless seizing of power from Nawaz Sharif in 1999. (K. A. Kronstadt 2008, p. 1) His emergency powers lasted for 6 weeks. Twelve days after the emergency order was rescinded, Benazir Bhutto, a leader of the opposition to Musharraf, was assassinated. Since that time, Pakistan has been in turmoil.

Apprehension about Pakistan's nuclear weapons security persists on a number of fronts. An *Arms Control Today* article argued that there are four major concerns: nuclear assets or technology falling into the wrong hands; Islamist takeover of the country via elections or after a governmental collapse; assassination attempt or elimination of key leaders resulting in a loss of control of the nuclear weapons; or secondary proliferation. (Luongo and Salik 2007)

While it may be argued that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal is relatively secure, the proliferation threat posed by the country is of greater concern. The long-term operation of the Khan network undermines world confidence in Pakistani nonproliferation. Al-Qaeda is known to have consulted with the Khan network. While the network has reportedly been dismantled, there is limited confidence that this has been the case. In particular, the fact that the world community has not been given access to Khan to discuss with him the exact nature and extent of his network has been problematic. Furthermore, the relatively light sentences doled out to Khan and his conspirators would seem to lack the capacity (or intention) to deter others who would wish to pick up where he stopped. (Fitzpatrick 2007, p. 12) Finally, the uncertain role that the Pakistani government itself played in the Khan network is troubling. While the government claims that it was unaware of Khan's activities, there are those who doubt that this is true. The most interesting summary of the information on the government's role is likely found in an IISS report. It states that:

The official Pakistani line—that the exports to Iran, North Korea, and Libya were the work of one errant man and his duped associates—cannot be taken at face value, but neither is there validity to the claim that Khan was a front, doing the government's bidding in each of these cases. ((International Institute for Strategic Studies 2007, p. 93)

Economics, Weapons, and Stability

Military spending in India went up following the Kargil crisis by about 28.2%--the largest increase in the country's history. Although it was maintained by the Indians that this would be spent on conventional weapons, speculation surrounded the funding as it was "unclear how much would be devoted to nuclear weapons, though the Pakistanis will no doubt fear the worst." (Bearak 2000)

A particular cause for concern in the sharp increase in India's defense services budget in 2005 from Rs. 60 billion to a huge Rs. 830 billion (\$19 billion). "This was three times higher than what India invests in primary education in government and private schools, and 275 percent higher than her public expenditure on health." (5) It came ironically at a time when both India and Pakistan initiated confidence-building measures. Although incidence of cross-border infiltrations have decreased since 2004, India has also spent considerably on construction a fence on its border with Pakistan to make the cease-fire line more like an international border. (Waldman 2004) An interview with former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in the wake of nuclear tests in May 1998, confirmed India's commitment to nuclear security over development.

Every decisive action has its consequences. But if the action is inherently in the national interest-and I believe our decision to conduct the tests is in supreme national interest-then we have to face the consequences and overcome the challenge. There is simply no other alternative. No price is high enough when it comes to securing national interests. We must be ready to face any eventuality. (Chawla n.d.)

Another significant impact of developing nuclear weapons has been the use of economic sanctions against India after it tested in 1998. Most of the US economic sanctions were lifted or eased within a few months of their imposition. (Rennack 2001) Furthermore, in the first eight months of 2001, the Bush administration hinted openly that the United States would like to remove the sanctions imposed against India (6) and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan. (7) However, the sanctions hurt India in different ways.

The immediate impact of the sanctions was evident. For India, from April to August 1998, "foreign direct investment recipients (FDI) receipts and deposits from non-resident Indians (NRIs) declined by US \$740 million. The estimated outflow of portfolio equity investment (PEI) was US \$2,286 million. India's stock market also declined by 7.3 percent shortly after the nuclear tests. Following Pakistan's response, there was an additional 5.6 percent decline." (Saez 2005) "Exports also fell by 7.54 percent during April-May 1998-99 as compared to the same period of the previous year, with the cotton yarn

and hardware sectors showing the steepest fall. During the month of May alone, exports recorded a negative growth rate of about 15 percent.” (Sharma 1998).

A very conservative estimate of the cost of an Indian nuclear weapons program suggests that at a minimum it costs Rs. 700-800 billion (around US \$16-19 billion at the 1999 purchasing power parity) a year. This is equivalent to an incremental cost of 0.5 percent of India’s GDP every year. The larger component in these costs is the outlay on delivery systems (missiles and nuclear submarines) and on a command and control system.

During the years of the Cold War, the US identified Pakistan as a strategic regional ally against the Soviets. The United States provided nearly \$2 billion in aid to Pakistan from 1953-1961. (Kronstadt 2008, p. 16) The US cut assistance in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971. Aid was cut again by the US at various points throughout the 1970s due to concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons aspirations. In the early 1980s, aid was offered again because the US wanted to have Pakistani assistance in the conflict against the Soviets in Afghanistan. By the mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s, aid cuts and sanctions were implemented based on the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. (Kronstadt 2008, pp. 16-17)

The periodic termination of US aid to Pakistan has most frequently been tied to advances in the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. A key factor in the US cessation of aid is the potential for it to destabilize the Pakistani government. Some have argued that Musharraf’s successful coup in 1999 was facilitated by the US sanctions after Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear weapons tests. (Ahmed, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices 1999, p. 197) The problem that has been identified is that Nawas Sharif’s regime was struggling economically and politically before the US imposed the sanctions. The economic impact of the sanctions then served to increase the instability and undermine public support for the Sharif regime, which facilitated Musharraf’s coup.

Since 9/11, the United States has relied on Pakistan as a strategic ally in the Global War on Terrorism.

According to the US Departments of State and Defense, Pakistan has afforded the United States unprecedented levels of cooperation by allowing the US military to use bases within the country, helping to identify and detain extremists, tightening the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and blocking terrorist financing. (Kronstadt 2008, p. 25)

This cooperation, however, has come with costs to both participants. President Musharraf has dealt with increasing opposition at home and rising anti-US sentiment due to his participation. (Shah 2002, p. 68) The large Islamic population in Pakistan is particularly against US involvement in the country. The increasing level of “Islamist extremism is contributing to even greater political instability” in the country. (Kronstadt 2008, pp. 2 + 12-14) On the US side, the failure of Musharraf to shift toward civilian governance and the protection of human rights has caused some to question the value of Pakistan as an ally and the US commitment to democracy abroad.

Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Strategic or Destabilizing

The relationship among these three countries faces the challenge of the divergence in their outlook on nuclear proliferation. “For India, a growing American concern about proliferation implied an increasingly hostile US attitude towards both the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons program, at a time when they had increasingly become dependent on their nuclear capabilities.” (Tellis 2006, p. 8) For the United States, by not entering the NPT and not becoming a signatory to the CTBT, India’s nuclear ambitions renewed concerns in the region. The relationship further deteriorated with India testing nuclear weapons in 1998 followed by the imposition of international economic and trade sanctions, particularly those that were imposed by the United States. Furthermore, led by the United States and China, the United Nations Security Council through Resolution 1172 “called on both India and Pakistan immediately to stop their nuclear weapons development programs; refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons; to cease the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons; and any further production of fissile material.” (8)

“However, in July 2005, the watershed agreement between India and the United States, for the transfer of nu

clear technology and fuel from United States in exchange for India opening up its nuclear facilities for IAEA inspections, left campaigners for a nuclear-free South Asia in shock and disbelief.” (Stone and Bagla 2006, p. 1356) Nonproliferation analysts accuse the Bush administration of sacrificing or selling out what had remained until the deal, the core of US nonproliferation values. Many, such as Daryl Kimball and Stephen Cohen, (9) have argued that the United States should have put more restraints on the fast breeder reactor program.

This deal complicates US policy-making for South Asian in a number of ways. First, it will likely motivate other nuclear aspirant countries such as North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran to demand similar concessions from the United States. Iran has already accused the US and India of double standards. This new deal could encourage Iran to conduct nuclear tests, in the hope that such actions will be legitimized over time. Second, the United States commitment towards nonproliferation itself is questioned with it becoming a de facto proliferator of nuclear technology and practicing selective proliferation. (10) For example, “India has been allowed by the United States to classify eight of its existing 22 reactors as military and keep them away from IAEA inspectors. Bush has also ruled out any such deal with Pakistan, causing further antagonism between India and Pakistan.” (Devraj 2006)

This nuclear deal poses a clear challenge to nonproliferation regimes and remains vulnerable to international condemnation. Many policymakers analyze the deal optimistically and point out the benefits of this deal for a “stronger American role in South Asia and for nonproliferation.” (Wilson 2007) To begin with, “legislators have praised the White House for strengthening ties with India.” (Stone and Bagla 2006, p 1356) The deal does this without allowing India to evade NPT restrictions. Second, the deal may prompt the NSG to alter rules that have prevented members from selling nuclear technology to India. This would facilitate India and France signing a bilateral nuclear deal. Third, under the Indo-US pact, the NSG and the IAEA would formulate India-specific nuclear safeguards. The NSG currently cannot supply “dual-use” nuclear technology to India as it does not meet the safeguards of the IAEA. Fourth, the United States will initiate a significant expansion of bilateral research cooperation with India, (11) giving it more leverage in the relationship with India. And most importantly, as noted by Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment, if India were assured stable supplies of uranium over the

long-term, it may not feel compelled to proceed with its advanced nuclear energy program that could be technically hazardous. (A. Tellis 2001) Finally, “the Indo-US nuclear agreement, by acknowledging an economic justification for allowing India access to nuclear energy, creates a new dependency between US national security policy and the energy profile of emerging nations.” (Thyagaraj and Thomas 2006, p. 355) By signing the deal, the United States is ensuring that the US would meet energy security for India and not other suppliers like Iran and Russia. (12)

Comparisons, Conclusions, and US Policy Options

There are a lot of similarities between the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs. Both were begun in a shroud of secrecy and were founded on the desire to improve security and increase power of the country within their region and in the world. Because of the strategic importance placed on acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, both India and Pakistan have prioritized these programs over national development activities.

Each country is currently involved in the development of safety and security measures to assure the protection of their arsenals. Due to evidence of a lack of security, there are concerns about both sides’ abilities to ensure that their weapons are sufficiently safeguarded. (Kampani 2005) Both countries are in the process of developing their nuclear doctrines, command and control structures, and policies. The current capacities on either side rely on aircraft or short missile flights for delivery of the weapons. This raises concerns for rapid escalation of a conflict, especially at times when both sides have troops massed along their shared border. India and Pakistan have both adopted “recessed deterrence” policies, which might offset this threat. (Kampani 2005) At the same time, neither side has a developed second-strike capacity, which may increase the impetus for a first strike.

There are differences between the countries and their programs as well. India is believed to be further behind in the development of its command and control policies than Pakistan. This is attributed to the fact that the Pakistani Army dominates the nuclear program and much of government, facilitating its development and implementation of policies. Furthermore, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program has always been focused on the single opponent of India. In contrast, India’s doctrine and weapons deployment have been developed to

encounter the perceived threats of both Pakistan and China. (Ahmed, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices* 1999) In 2003, India declared a no-first-use policy. Pakistan has somewhat different policy, which allows for the potential use of a nuclear weapon in response to certain types of threats including: an Indian chemical or biological attack; large scale territorial penetration from India; destruction of a large part of the Pakistani military; economic strangulation of Pakistan by India; or the threat of significant political destabilization. (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2007, pp. 37-38)

The research conducted for this paper would indicate that the Pakistani and Indian nuclear weapons programs have been, and continue to be, destabilizing to both countries and the region. The weapons capability now present in the region increases the tensions between the two states and the perceived costs of minor conflict. Nuclear terrorism and proliferation from the region are also potential problems. While Pakistan claims that its weapons are secure from terrorist acquisition, uncertainty remains. Indian weapons are reportedly not much more secure.

The economic impact from the development of nuclear weapons on both India and Pakistan were certainly significant. However, these costs were deemed worthwhile by both countries due to the power and prestige associated with the nuclear capacity. The oft-quoted statement of Pakistani foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1966 "that if India acquired a bomb, 'even if Pakistanis have to eat grass, we will make the bomb'" is indicative of the lengths to which the governments were willing to go to get this capacity. (Ahmed, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices* 1999, 183) However, a nuclear arms race between the two would carry additional financial burdens. One estimate of the cost to the United States for maintaining the American nuclear capacity put the price tag at just under \$5.5 trillion, while the cost of maintaining its nuclear capacity is identified as a major factor in the collapse of the Soviet economic system. (Talbot 1999, p. 117)

The development of weapons deployment doctrine, safety and security practices, nonproliferation principles, and command and control capacities are important activities for regional security. Unless and until the states within the region are comfortable with the nuclear weapons policies of these states, the potential for instability is great. Established doctrine and practices could also temper conflicts between the Pakistan and India.

The United States has many opportunities to influence this process as it continues to develop. Currently, relatively positive relations between the US and both India and Pakistan may facilitate US involvement in the development of nuclear weapons policies. Certainly there are limits to the amount of influence the US can have, but any amount of pressure it can apply to encourage restraint and security would be beneficial. Pakistan has already proven itself willing (if reluctant) to accept US offers to help in securing their weapons. It is not in either country's interest to have their nuclear weapons fall into the hands of other states or sub-national groups. US offers of assistance in securing weapons and materials, accompanied perhaps by IAEA actions, may help to assure the region and world that the weapons are indeed safe.

US policy-makers and military personnel must be conscious of the fact that the Pakistani conventional disadvantage likely drives their thinking about the nuclear option. As in the Kargil case, Pakistan may be very willing to threaten to use nuclear weapons if it feels conventionally outmatched or challenged. This was alleviated in the Kargil instance by mediation from the US. It is likely that this will be the best policy for the US to pursue in times of conflict.

"Since the United States cannot undertake or sustain its war on nuclear terrorism unilaterally," construction of alliances with Russia, China, Pakistan, and India would demonstrate its seriousness with reducing this threat. (Allison 2004, p. 6) The United States has worked with India to enhance its capabilities to combat terrorism and increase interoperability. (US Department of State, Bureau of Resource Management 2003; Rocca 2003; and US Department of Defense 2003) US military sales to India include \$29 million worth of equipment meant to enhance the counter-terrorism capabilities of India's special forces, and India may also purchase chemical and biological protection equipment. (Blake 2004) As mentioned previously, the US has also worked with Pakistan to ensure the security of their arsenal.

Nuclear nonproliferation pressure should continue to be applied to both states. Neither country has been willing to ratify the NPT or sign the CTBT. The United States needs to find a way to incentivize cooperation in nonproliferation agreements or, at a minimum, start laying the groundwork for the adoption of nonproliferation as part of the cultural norms of the countries. It is likely that, given the popularity and expanse of the Khan network, this will be a major challenge in Pakistan.

The US should use all means at its disposal to resolve disputes with India and Pakistan without the imposition of sanctions. The economic situations in both countries are precarious and could be detrimentally impacted by sanctions. While sanctions seem to be a preferred option that allow US government to show that it is “doing something” about a problem without having to commit troops, the negative effects on both economic and political stability are clear in the region. Perhaps, at least for a time, the carrot of incentive packages would be a more useful tool to use with these competitors rather than the stick of sanctions.

Finally, the US needs to continue to engage both India and Pakistan in the Global War on Terror. Both countries are experiencing the destabilizing influence of extremism.

Demonstrating to them that it is in their interest to reduce the instability posed to the region and their own states from terrorism should be no major challenge. However, determining the extent and form of their participation in the war and establishing what activities will be supported by their domestic constituencies will be key to the success of these endeavors.

Alethia H. Cook is assistant professor of political science and assistant director of the Security Studies Program at East Carolina University.

Anjali Sahay is Assistant Professor of political science at Gannon University

ISLAM, JIHADISM AND DEPOLITICIZATION IN FRANCE AND GERMANY

By Anouar Boukhars

A growing number of Europeans fear that Europe faces “a Muslim problem” (Leiken, 2005; Bawer, 2006; Läidi, 2002). The 2006 global ravages of the cartoon crisis, triggered by offensive and disparaging cartoons of the Prophet Mohamed as a terrorist and lecher, coupled with the alleged plot to blow up U.S.-bound airliners have made more people fear not only Europe's homegrown radicals but Islam itself, a religion increasingly seen as posing a direct threat to Western liberal democracy. Majorities in Europe believe that it is the tyranny of Islamic

tradition and Muslims’ anti-integration attitudes and innate hostility to democratic and civilized ideals that breed Muslims’ anti-state orientations—not socio-economic marginality, political exclusion, repressive tactics of the police, and lack of opportunity (Leveau, 1997; Marchand, 2002; Joly, 2007 ; Bertossi and Wihtol de Wenden, 2007). In every European country, public debate is consumed by the dangers of Islamic dogma, the urgency of breaking the religious collective and the necessity of taming and institutionalizing Islam within a much more secularized and secularized process. There is less debate about the fact that it is probably the unsuccessful implementation of the equality of the European democratic model that has resulted in today’s acute crisis of citizenship and unity.

Little attention is devoted to the fact that civic unrest result from serious problems of political representation rather than from the politicization of Islam, ‘communalism’ of Muslims or their ‘static collectivist’ culture(s). Unfortunately, the 2005 riots in France and other political disturbances in several countries of Europe have not prompted any meaningful revision of this fear-laden perspective of politicized Muslims, seen as imbued with a hostile religious collective and group-identity politics that resist integration and promote separatist beliefs and radical tendencies. Notwithstanding the small numbers of radical Islamists, state officials in most European countries, for example, lump all Islamists together as quintessentially undemocratic, oppressive and anti-Western. There is a tendency to conjure the worst case scenarios in which non-violent Islamists turn into terrorists or at the very least trouble-makers who instigate civic unrest.

Throughout Europe, the public discourse has become more culturalist and policy responses are increasingly colored by ideology than much needed pragmatism. It is in this context that this paper tries to debunk the widespread belief that Islam and the politicization of some Muslims are what contribute to their radicalization. Contrary to popular expectations, it is the depoliticization of Muslims and the failure of political Islamism in Europe that have sparked the rise of radical communal ideologies and anti-systemic movements. By focusing on two different cases with two different types of Muslims, this paper demonstrates how the failure of Muslims to organize politically and the exhaustion of political Islamism have heightened the potential for political and social disturbances.

The first part of this paper analyzes how the vacuum created by the failure of political Islamism and the decline of the associative network of the movements of young Muslims in French suburbs paved the way for the emergence of disturbing phenomena like the random violence of the 2005 November riots in France and the radicalization of a segment of indignant Islamic youths, angry at their social, political and economic exclusion and outraged over the bloodshed in Iraq and Palestine. It also examines how political underrepresentation of Muslims and their loss of faith in political Islamists have given birth to a new form of salafi religiosity that is distinguished by its *different shapes* and streams. The second part focuses on Germany's Muslims and their differences with those of France. One objective of this second section is to illustrate how despite the fact that the majority of Muslims, especially those of Turkish origin, have so far resisted embracing the anti-systemic ideologies that penetrated France, there is no guarantee that most Turks would indefinitely shun violence as a means to protest against state discrimination or widespread Islamophobia. The recent arrest of two Turks implicated in a terrorist conspiracy and the growth of Turkish jihadi literature are frightening examples of the potential for radicalization within the Turkish community.

Cultural Anxiety in France

In France, fear of Islam and its extremist elements is not a new phenomenon. The 1995 bombings in the Paris Métro alarmed the French to the threat of radical Islamism (1). The French authorities subsequent sweeps revealed the nexus between drugs, crime and radical Islamism and the discrete patterns of terror networks like the "gang of Roubaix," a collection of militants of Algerian descent led by Christopher Caze, a 25-year-old convert who had traveled to Bosnia to work as a hospital medic only to return as a dangerous radical. The dreadful events of 11 September heightened this fear of radical Islamism. In the eyes of the native French, the main culprits were of course the Muslim youth of the suburbs, suspected of sympathizing with the extremists.

The feeling that France is under Muslim siege has been propelled by a wave of xenophobia and populism already washing over the European continent. The series of terrorist attacks on Madrid and London's underground and bus system compounded by France's restive Muslim enclaves have invoked troubling questions about the roles of race, Islam, and ethnicity and the challenges to European states' 'integrationist' models. In the French context, ethnicity, culture and Islam tend to be conflated and

portrayed as the main causes of social and economic marginality (Cesari, 2005). The youth of the banlieues are usually "equated with thieves", "veilers" and most recently as "scum that has to be simply scrubbed out" (*Le Monde*, 2005). This "symbolic ghettoization" of poorer neighborhoods known as "*cités*" or "*quartiers difficiles*" in the political discourse and the media has hyped the threat of illusory concepts like "*communatarisation*" or communalism of ethnic ghettos living parallel lives to French uniqueness and the ideology of the republic.

But as the 2005 November riots in France demonstrated, the unrest was neither an Arab Intifada against the republican ideals of "liberté, égalité, fraternité" nor jihad of Muslims against France. In fact, neither Islam nor Islamism with its three different types (jihadi, missionary, and political) instigated the riots. There were no Palestinian or other Islamic green flags nor were there any anti-Semitic arson attacks against Jewish synagogues, schools, or cemeteries. Arafat-style keffiyehs were noticeably absent as well as the usual suspects: the *Bearded Provocateurs* (Roy, 2005). There were no shouts of "Allahu akbar!" (God is great) erupting from the rioters. Most importantly, the riots did not spread outside the suburbs nor did they extend to the universities where students feel the same grievances and resentments against a system that in their view works against them (Roy, 2005). The spontaneity of the riots and lack of bearded leaders contrast with the theories of self-segregating Islamic communities fuelled by Islamic radicalism and other crude cultural arguments that abound in media commentaries and popular discourse.

Interestingly enough, neither the politically minded Islamist organizations, like the Union of French Islamic Associations (UOIF) nor missionary Islamists like the *Tabligh* or the predicative *salafis* managed to salve the rage of male youngster rioters, aged between 12 and 25 years old. Shortly after the outbreak of the spontaneous riots, leaders of UOIF rushed to defuse the crisis hoping to prove their influence over second generation migrants in the "*cités*" and hence score points with the authorities and the public at large. They failed to accomplish either objective. Appeals for calm in the mosques on November 4 fell on deaf ears as did the 'Anti Riot *Fatwa*' issued on November 6 by UOIF. The failure of one of France's largest Islamist groups to lower tensions and break the chain of violent events speaks volumes about the disconnect of political Islamist movements with the social base they claim to

represent.

The Union of Islamic Organizations of France lost the deprived French banlieues because of the leadership failure to develop a discourse attuned to the realities of the “*quartiers difficiles*” as the French like to call their Muslim enclaves. French-born Muslims denounce the structural weakness of the UOIF and their deliberate marginalization from decision making and leadership positions within the movement. The UOIF structure suffers from concentration of power in too few foreign born hands like the case of the 51 years old Tunisian, Muhammad Ateb, who is at the same time a representative of the UOIF in Bourgogne region, Imam of the Dijon Mosque, president of the regional administration council of CRCM, and editor in chief of a magazine (Amghar, 2005b). The defection in June 2005 of Farid Abdelkrim, the only member in the administration council born in France, is a direct result of this growing disenchantment with the leadership’s political orientation (Ternissien, 2002).

The UOIF and other political Islamist organizations thought that by taking advantage of existing possibilities to participate in a political system usually fraught with politically motivated resistance, they would maximize their influence with the authorities and attenuate fears of politically minded religious groups. But the groups’ calculus as well as those of the authorities who co-opted them backfired. The UOIF image was severely tarnished in the suburbs because of the perception that the group was co-opted by the interior ministry at their own expense. The UOIF low-profile critical posture vis-à-vis the French law banning the *Hijab* (headscarf) in state schools (2004) and the disparaging Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohamed (2006) has given the impression that the organization’s leadership has been co-opted by the French authorities. Some French born Muslims also criticize the UOIF for its lack of robust involvement in the Palestinian issue.

This loss of faith in political Islamists exacerbated by political underrepresentation and the disengagement of French Muslims from the institutional space has created a dangerous void and an organizational vacuum where political and social demands are increasingly expressed through rioting and to a lesser extent through jihadism. And while it is true that there is little evidence of widespread religious radicalism, there are signs that Salafi groups, a once insignificant presence in Europe, are on the ascendance (Amghar, 2005a). There are three types of salafi groups in France: predicative, political and jihadist.

The first category represents by far the dominant stream of salafism in France (Amghar, 2006). In opposition to the jihadis, they are apolitical and non-violent. (2) They take their cues from the Meccan period, when the prophet Mohamed propagated “verses of peaceful persuasion” rather than revolt.

This period, which lasted from the start of the prophet revelations to his emigration to Medina, was marked by the adoption of a non-confrontational method of propagation by a rejected and persecuted prophet who judiciously avoided application of violence even in the face of a bloody environment. This analogy to the Meccan period is purposefully used by this brand of salafism to denounce the jihadi activism of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and the political activism of the politicians (3) (Wiktorowicz, 2006). Predicative salafists resent what they see as the misappropriation of religious texts to justify clearly utilitarian strategies drawn from such non-Islamic sources as Third World anti-imperialism and Western social and political revolutionary models. It is for this reason that they have shunned, denounced and boycotted the jihadists and political Salafists’ publications. In their view, salafists should be the conscience of society, not the wielders of deviant religious innovations that contradict the prophetic model whereby *aqida* (creed) drives Salafi *manhaj* (method). In other words, salafists must follow the qu’ran and replicate the model laid out by the prophet Mohamed in both action and deed. Mohamed is seen as the Muslim exemplar who embodies the ultimate *perfection of faith, character, and the will of God*.

The politicians belong to the minority camp within the salafi movement in France. Their ideological underpinnings derive from a mixture of the political trend of the Muslim brotherhood and the purist tradition of the apolitical Saudi salafism. This fusion started in the 1950s and 1960s when Saudi Arabia became home to elements of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, and Syria. Fleeing political persecution at home, Muslim Brotherhood members found refuge in the Saudi educational system and large Saudi charities, like the Muslim World League, where they built strength, laying the groundwork for the development of a new hybrid of political salafism. (Amghar, 2006). The Muslim brothers, as Wiktorowicz aptly pointed out, “had a long history of political engagement and enjoyed a sophisticated understanding of political events, international affairs, and the world outside Saudi Arabia. Their arrival on the Saudi scene was an energizing force for young students eager to

learn more about the modern world.” (Wiktorowicz, 2006).

The jihadi brand of salafism is the most revolutionary of the three. Its goal is the projection of a privatized neo-salafist transnational order whose most distinctive feature finds expression not in the resurrection of a recidivist religious past but in a virtual umma that is a by-product of an odd-mix of re-islamization, de-culturation and reactionary modernism. The construction of this imagined community functions as the spearhead of a revolutionary universal umma confident in its final armed victory against what it sees as the imperialist West.

Rise of Predicative Salafism

Predicative salafism today diffuses among a small segment of the uprooted and touches private aspirations with its disquieting “moralistic spirit” and fixation on rejuvenating the loss of the prophetic model and utopian Qu’ranic possibilities that Muslim secularists ‘disavowed’ and ‘defeatist’ political Islamists ‘betrayed’. Inspired and given direction by a handful of Saudi religious leaders, this form of salafism capitalizes on the travails of political Islam, a declining force that failed to translate its societal project into meaningful gains for its constituency. The apoliticos attribute the movement’s loss of social and political relevance to the concessions political Islamists made to modernity and its secular majoritarian vision of politics. To this once enthusiastic but ultimately dismal vision of a political Islam working within established modes of Western thought and discourse to subvert the discriminatory dynamic present in French society, they claim to offer an opportunity to break the unIslamic elements of political thinking and reconstruct a purely emancipatory transcendent counter-discourse that clings to simplistic but idealized notions of a more authentic global social order, guided by a pristine and simple prophetic model, full of life-affirming meaning.

The apoliticos posit themselves as the avant-garde of a Muslim community betrayed by the cultural and national forms of Islam and decomposed by opportunistic political Islamists and jihadists who have succumbed to the fickleness of human desire, political intrigue and the attraction of non-Islamic models, resulting in deviations from the Salafi manhaj and sectarianism that the prophet of Islam warned against. “I am leaving you two things and you will never go astray as long as you cling to them. They are the Book of Allah and my Sunna,” prophet Mohamed advised his followers (Wiktorowicz, 2006: 207-239). Another hadith that the apoliticos use

quite frequently as evidence of the righteousness of their creed and as vindication of their identity markers as *Ahl al-Hadith* (people of Hadith), *ta’ifat al-mansura* (the Aided Group), and *al-firqa al-najiyya* (the Saved Sect) is the one where the prophet predicted that the Muslim community “will divide into seventy-three sects all of which except one will go to Hell and they are those who are upon what I and my Companions are upon” (Wiktorowicz, 2006). The apoliticos constantly remind their followers of the traditions of the prophet and comfort them with his *hadiths* and those of his companions.

Armed with arrogant but passionate religious conviction and delirious intensity, they strive to inject elements of certainty and determinacy into a Muslim minority community beset with a sense of aggravated vulnerability and identity confusion. Without necessarily challenging the fixed borderlines of the secular French culture, they try to set in motion their “civilizing” global mission of realizing the divine *raison d’être* of creation through potent but peaceful propagation of the epistemological promise of *Tawhid* (doctrine of Oneness of God) and the true decontextualised teachings of the Qur’an and Sunna. Through purification (*tazkiyya*), and cultivation (*tarbiya*), they hope to actualize the divine will in politically and socially marginalized and disempowered Muslim masses. The essence of their prophetic mission—in this case a revival of the lost teachings of the earlier salaf and deconstruction of traditional notions of established authority—impresses a segment of the Muslim population by its simplicity, anti-intellectualism and confident projection of the possibility of reinventing an ahistorical transnational identity that trumps discredited traditional cultures of origin and shuns local European secularism.

Abdel-Hadi Dudi, the imam of the al-Sunna al-Kebira Mosque in Marseille, is the icon of the predicative brand of the salafi movement in France. A graduate of Al-Azhar University and a former mentor of Ali Benhadj, a former high school teacher known for his militant views of the role of political Islam, Abdel-Hadi Dudi belonged to the Algerian salafist movement that helped create the *FIS* in 1989. Condemned to death by the Algerian regime for his involvement in Mustapha Bouyali’s Armed Islamic Movement (MIA), he took refuge in France with the tacit approval of the Algerian authorities. It is Abdel-Hadi Dudi teachings that birthed and fermented the Salafi movement in Marseille. His influence spread rapidly with the endorsement he received from Rabi al-Madkhali, the foremost authority in salafism in France. According to the Crisis Group,

the conversion of Abdel-Hadi Dudi from salafi jihadism into predicative salafism is in line with the transformation that the salafi movement underwent in the second part of the 1990's. The first return of French students from Saudi Arabia in 1995 contributed to the development of a quietist salafism strongly influenced by Saudi theologians, namely those that belonged to the "*madkhaliste*" current. Abdelkader Bouziane is a case in point. Of Algerian origin, he studied for two years in the Islamic University of Medina. Upon his return to France, he became the imam of the Mosque of Villefranche-sur-Saône, Duchère (Lyon) and Vénissieux where he played a critical role in the spread of salafism in the region of Rhône-Alpes. The arrival at the end of the 1990's of Saudi preachers in French soil, especially in Île-de-France, at the mosques of Mureaux and d'Argenteuil, strengthened this movement. Predicative salafists began to aggressively take over some mosques where they encountered only feeble resistance from their weakened rivals (Smolar, 2005). Through the practice of *durûs* (study with salafi mentors and self-proclaimed imams) in the mosques, they managed to infiltrate their way in places of worship as Bouziane did in the grand mosque of Lyon. Contrary to Tabligh and other Islamist movements, Salafism has no hierarchical structures and recognize no form of leadership.

The rise of this ultra-strict but quietist salafism has laid the groundwork for a new re-Islamisation that delinks Islam from ethnic cultures and disconnects the religious from the political in a way that reflects individualist concerns. The movement's relative success with a limited number of Muslim youth can be attributed not only to the failures of political Islam in Algeria and France but also to the emergence of a modern trend of the culture of the self in the suburbs whereby cynical, disempowered and alienated young French Muslims opt out of politics to become social, political and moral isolationists, paralyzed by their disdain of society. Rather than organizing the Muslim community into a model of citizenship consecrated to fighting social exclusion and strengthening Muslim social cohesion, predicative salafists activate the depoliticisation of the religious.

Salafists, as French scholar Olivier Roy correctly pointed out, play on the deculturation and individualization of youth and provide a substitute cultural paradigm and a new tradition that is similar to the model of the "born again," in that it does not promote a return to traditional Islamic customs but a (re)Islamization of individuals within a de-territorialized *ummah* disconnected from traditional cultures and societies (Roy, 2004). Unlike

political Islamists who aspire to create a model of integration through citizenship, contemporary predicative salafists advocate the creation of a new and purely Islamic religiosity that focuses on salvation, moral values and self-realization while maintaining a general aloof attitude towards the social and political issues that triggered the riots in France (Cesari, 2004). This explains their non-involvement in the protests against the headscarf ban and other religious apparel from public schools. The apoliticals also remained silent on the deportation of Salafi imams from France while non-religious associations like *L'Aube* and *DiverCité* mobilized protests in favor of the expelled imams. They did not even offer support to Abdelkader Bouziane, who is widely credited with spreading salafism to the Rhône-Alpes region, when he was deported to Algeria for defending wife-beating (Crisis Group, 2006).

The main rival of this form salafism in the banlieues is Tabligh which is struggling to jealously guard its 'holy' turf against the aggressive encroachment of a movement that is shrewdly capitalizing on its current high-water mark status and its arsenal of theological production that outpaces that of its main rival (Khedimellah, 2004). *Tabligh* is, of course, still a force to be reckoned with but it is a force that is on the defensive. The movement has lost a number of its followers to salafism, including some of its preachers. There is no denying that Tabligh has lost some of its luster among the youth of the banlieues who regard its theological orientation as slowly decaying and unfit for their needs. The movement suffers from a serious image problem that is associated with the youths' grandfather's Islam and the Indian cultural context where it first originated unlike salafism which is regarded as an agent of novelty and true belief. This is one reason why salafism's main recruits are aged 15 to 35 years old.

Predicative salafism becomes thus the conscience of a new globalized Islam, purified by the individualization of faith and rejection of un-Islamic accretions of traditional religious authorities and ethnic communities. The rejection of non-Islamic produced innovations reflects a break with traditional and national cultures. Contrary to popular belief, the ascent of predicative salafism does not reflect a rebellion of a traditional culture, stuck to a narrative of the past. It is a mistake to place the underlying conflict between this form of salafism and Western cultures in a larger cultural and historical context. Salafism in France is not a reaction of the traditional and national cultures of ethnic immigrants. Rather, it reflects the loss of cultural tradition to a new

individualized religiosity that smacks of self-learning and a disaffiliation from community ties, local space and traditions (Roy, 2004). Salafists encourage young people to rebel against their parents and press women to leave their 'non-pious' husbands unless they repent and join *al-firqa al-najiyya* (the Saved Sect). Young salafists also forcefully challenge imams of the old generation in their understanding of Islam. In this sense, salafism becomes a youth-centered comprehensive and individualized model that recruits less where communal solidarities are strong. This explains why the movement does not fare well in Turkish communities permeated by communalism.

This expressive religious individualism is both a product of and a factor in globalization. There is a compound relationship between the formation of Muslim selves and the processes of the global forces of consumerism, best exemplified by the articulation of salafi practices to the consumption culture (Amghar, 2005). The rise of "Halal fast-food", "Islamic" hamburgers, "Mecca Cola", and "Islamic rap" is clearly a result of this articulation process that is in line with the practice of consumerism (Boubeker, 2005). It is also a clear result of the break with the culinary cuisine of their ethnic communities. Salafists of North African origin are more interested in selling Greek sandwiches and pizzas than Moroccan couscous or Algerian traditional food (Roy, 2005). The same pattern applies when it comes to clothing. Salafists prefer trading in streetwear business with islamized labels like MBN (Muslim by Nature) and *Dawahwear* than in the hijabs and djellabas (Crisis Group, 2006).

Despite their rhetorical critique of the excesses of hypercommercialism, predicative salafists are not opposed to consumerism. Thus, contrary to expectations, consumerism is not connoted negatively in the salafists vision in France. Indeed, salafism is neither anti-modern not necessarily anti-modernist. The movement works within and against globalization. It rejects philosophical rationalism and intellectualism but champions individualism and consumerism in the name of fundamentalism. It is this image of salafism as an anti-intellectual movement unbound by traditions and historical baggage that makes it most appealing to a segment of beleaguered minorities. Its revamped notion of globalized "Muslimship" is in line with the realities of unemployed and uneducated youth, enamored of the consumer culture they live in while at the same time being resentful of French racism and the stigma of a terrorist culture.

Salafism 'emancipatory' alternatives to discriminatory existing societies and polluted ethnic cultures and local islams find resonance not only with some segments of the youth of the enclave communities of the ghettos but also with some disenchanted Muslim Middle classes who are enthralled by the idea of emigrating to Muslim countries with great potential of economic growth. The Saudi godfathers of French predicative salafism have long advocated a *Hijrah* (migration) from the domain of *Shirk* (disbelief) and oppression to the secure lands of Islam. The Palestinians are reminded by Rabi al-Madkhali that the recovery of Palestine would not occur via jihad but through a "second *Hijrah*" to the countries of the gulf. French Muslims are urged to leave France to the promised lands of the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Qatar and other gulf countries. As for those Muslims suffering authoritarian repression by Middle Eastern dictators, they are encouraged to leave their homeland and settle in the gulf or even Western countries, known for their tradition of religious pluralism (Crisis Group, 2006). This new *Hijrah* plugs salafism into globalization and further into consumerism. Most Salafist aspire to emigrate to realize their Salafi dream of enriching themselves spiritually as well as financially. For salafists, *Hijrah*, an important principle in Islam, is made to be a panacea for most Muslim problems.

As for those who cannot afford to make the *Hijrah*, they are urged to disengage from society, developing an enclave mentality predicated on transnational inerrant salafi creed. Ironically, this aspiration to emigrate to promising Muslim lands places this new Muslim generation in the same situation their parents were in when they hoped to return back to their home countries. There are, of course, major differences between the two aspirations. The result is, however, the same. Both generations eschewed involvement in the affairs of the French state because of the fleeting belief that one day they would leave France.

In summary, this form of salafism has found a relative degree of success among a small segment of the Muslim population due to the vision it offers of a reconstructed transnational identity, a self-righteous citadel that is capable of transcending the feelings of humiliation and alienation from the discriminating institutions of power. But despite this appeal, predicative salafism has failed to garner the support of all those Muslims who are hungry for social justice and immediate political empowerment.

As neither pietistic movements like the predicative salafism or *tabligh* nor politically minded salafists or Islamists groups like UOIF are capable of or interested in organizing a Muslim youth underclass, the *banlieues* slid into a dangerous confusion and organizational vacuum where political and social demands have been increasingly expressed through rioting and to a lesser extent through jihadism.

Who are the Jihadi-Salafis?

Jihadi salafism is a revolutionary movement that is increasingly domestically grown, a marked shift from the past when violent salafism was strictly linked to foreign Islamist militants who internationalized and externalized their grievances into France with a wave of terrorist bombings. The 1986 bombings perpetrated by Fouad Ali Saleh, a close associate of Hizbollah, bore a strong terrorist warning from Tehran to Paris to stop supporting Saddam's Hussein war against Iran, crack down on Iranian exiles in France and leave Lebanon. Iran through its leading surrogate, Hizbollah, recruited Fouad Ali Saleh who spent three years studying in Qom, Iran, under Ayatollah Khomeini, and other Tunisian-born expatriates converted to Shiism to try to intimidate the French government into changing its foreign policy. The result was a months-long terror campaign between December 1985 and September 1986 that killed 13 and injured hundreds. The point of connection between the Beirut-based Party of God and the 20-person terrorist network came via Iran. In the early 1990's, a different connection developed between Maghrebi youth in the destitute *banlieues* of France and foreign sponsored terrorist organizations. This time, however, Iran was not the source or patron of terror. Jihadism came via Algeria where the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) "recruited young thugs, exploiting their larcenous talents to raise money and build an infrastructure to attack France for its support of the Algerian government" (Crumley, 2001).

Since the mid-1990's however, a high percentage of French jihadists were born in France, detached from any given culture and stimulated by a 'de-territorialized' Islam that promises the uprooted Islamic diaspora a transnational Islamic identity, forged in anti-imperialist discourse. This transnational jihad obsesses no longer about the creation of particular Muslim states but at a mythical final battle between the *umma* and the forces of Western 'evil'. "We are at war and I am a soldier," proclaims Muhammad Sidique Khan in a videotape that rails against what he calls the atrocities committed by Europe's "democratically elected

governments" against Muslims. "Now you too will taste the reality of this situation," he warns (BBC, 2005). Most jihadists are captivated by this anti-imperialist dimension of transnational jihadism as is clearly shown by the small number of converts to Islam who came to find solace in an anti-system Islamist supportive milieu that promises a way out of alienation and delinquency into a new life of jihadi brotherhood capable of challenging what they believe is a hegemonic Western system perceived as racist and discriminatory. "Converts will be used for striking more and more by [jihadist](#) circles," warns Jean-Luc Marret, a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations and a terrorism expert at the Strategic Research Foundation, in Paris. "They have been used in the past for proselytism, logistics or support, and they are operationally useful now" (Smith, 2004). What is troublesome about the transition to jihadism is the fact that it occurs in relatively short time frames. In over 50 % of cases, the transition to radicalism was short (Khosrokhavar, 2006). Contrary to expectations, terror is not bound to Islamic extremism nor is it the product of long term indoctrination (Pape, 2005).

It is increasingly evident that the jihadist enterprise draws strength in part from its development out of, and alongside, strong opposition to perceived Western expansionist policies that tend to favor militarism and empire. This strong rejection of the West's perceived politico-ideological hegemony and its "predatory" free market globalization is what enables and drives jihadi madness. It is, therefore, a mistake to view the jihadist's terrorist madness as emanating from a crude moral absolutism. There is little doubt that it is the perception of America's politico-ideological pursuit of imposing its hegemony on the Muslim world that fuels the angry and exclusivist outlook of jihadists' visions of vengeance. Karim Hassoun's sentiment that "The more body bags of Americans we see coming back from Iraq, the happier we are," echoes with disturbing frequency those of a small segment of young French Muslims who come from atypical backgrounds and are convinced that the US and its European allies are conspiring to destroy Islam (Powell, 2005).

Contrary to expectations, the jihadists' enterprise is not fuelled by a blind obsession with a chauvinist version of Islamic morals and the strict dictates of dogma. Unlike the customary jihadists' violent assault on liquor stores, clubs and cinemas, the target of the new transnational jihadists is not Muslim or French "depravity" but Western imperialism as is clearly shown by the dismantled Beghal network that hoped to attack the American

embassy in Paris and the neutralization of a Tchetchen network, suspected of involvement in a planned attack on Russian targets in Paris, in the banlieues of Lyon and Paris in 2002, and the January 2005 dismantlement of Farid Benyettou cell which is widely credited with influencing a number of local young Muslims to go and fight the Americans in Iraq. This indignation at perceived Western imperial policies at the global level is compounded and exacerbated by local economic, *social and political exclusion*. *The latter constitutes a key element in the radicalization process. In other words, Muslim radicalization in France, and throughout Europe, is not caused by a long process of religious indoctrination or maturation but by political marginalization at home and perceived Western injustices against Muslims abroad.*

In summary, the rise of salafism in France result from serious problems of political representation rather than from the “*communatarisation*” of the *Banlieues* or Muslims’ static collectivist culture(s) that threaten the symbols of a jittery nation and deepen Muslims ‘chosen’ status of extraterritoriality and ‘voluntary’ apartheid. Despite their differences and marginal success in mobilizing Muslims, all three tendencies of salafism distinguish themselves by their defiance of a political order that is incapable of or unwilling to accommodate the concerns and grievances of French Muslims.

Germany's discomfort with its Muslim minority

As in France, there is a noticeable increase in the radicalization of a small segment of the Muslim community in Germany that is a direct result of social marginalization and the West's perceived politico-ideological hegemony over the Muslim world. The fear of Islamist terrorism in Germany has reached new heights. A recent survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, a research center in Turin, Italy, documented a sharp increase in the number of Germans who are becoming increasingly nervous about their vulnerability to terrorism. Majorities are resigned to the fact that living with terrorist threats might become part of their daily life. Some 70 percent feel that they are likely to suffer a terrorist attack, which is a 32 percent increase since 2005.

Ever since the discovery of the Hamburg-based terrorist cell at the heart of the September 11 attacks, there has been a growing fear about a perceived Islamist wave sweeping across Germany, seeking to re-Islamize its Muslim minorities, deepening their presumed status of “extraterritoriality” and expanding their “culture-based

crime.” Warnings about the transformation of Germany and the rest of Europe into an anti-Christian, anti-Western “Eurabia” (Ye’or, 2005), and the emerging dawn of “the darkness of a new barbarism” that threatens to overtake the symbols of the nation and subjugate a destructively passive and self-doubting population, are rampant in political and media rhetoric. The fear of the “unwanted Germans” living fraudulently and infiltrating the citadels of Germanness prompted a bishop emeritus of Germany's Independent Lutherans to express his anxiety in striking terms: “I fear that we are approaching a situation resembling the tragic fate of Christianity in northern Africa in Islam's early days” (Mulrine, 2005).

This perception of Muslim communities as knowingly nursing a fifth column of sleepers’ cells, secret sympathizers and potential insurgents is increasingly creeping to the center of public debate to the point of becoming “just one step short of conspiracy theories like the all-too familiar anti-Semitic stereotype that world Judaism is capable of committing virtually any wicked deed to achieve its ends” (Seidel, 2005). Even egregious acts like female genital mutilation which have nothing to do with Islam are viewed by large segments of the public as Islamic atrocities prescribed by the Qu’ran. This ancient African tradition which is still practiced in some Muslim and non-Muslim countries is sometimes deliberately depicted by the media as religiously sanctioned. “In order to launch a campaign in Egypt against female circumcision, the religious leaders there would first have to be convinced of its pointlessness. Islam is the state religion. 93% of the population is of the Muslim faith,” *Frau im Leben* magazine wrote (Schiffer, 2004). This is a clear example where the magazine associates genital mutilation of girls in Egypt with Islam. These misleading and false statements are rampant in the media. For example, one study found that while announcements of raids of mosques were always featured on the front pages of most papers, raid findings, however, were buried inside the papers or went unreported due to the failure of most raids to uncover any evidence of terror crimes. It is, therefore, not surprising that Muslim places of worship are increasingly seen as incubators of terror.

The Threat of Islamist Terrorism to Germany

These views of Muslims and their religion have hardened in the last few years.

The al-Qaeda threats to Germany over its forces in Afghanistan coupled with the arrest of four Arab men accused of supporting al-Tawhid—a terrorist organization

believed to have links to al-Qaeda—have alarmed German authorities to the rising jihadi threat in their country. The three Jordanians terror plotters - Mohamed Abu Dhees, Ismail Shalabi, and Ashraf al-Dagma – and the Algerian - Djamel Moustfa - were charged with planning terrorist attacks on the Berlin's Jewish Museum and a Jewish-owned discotheque or bar in Düsseldorf. Germany is also still haunted by the last aborted terrorist plot to bomb trains in Dortmund and Koblenz. The devices planted by two Lebanese men, were hidden in large suitcases and fitted with alarm clocks for timers set to go off 10 minutes before the trains arrived.

The fact that converts to Islam were also implicated in other terrorist activities added to the scare of Germans. Deputy CDU floor leader Wolfgang Bosbach went as far as to declare that conversion to Islam contributes to radicalization and to ultimate recruitment by a terrorist organization. "We know that some who convert become radicalized," Bosbach argued (Spiegel Online, September 12). Of course, this is not the first time that converts have been involved in terrorist networks. In 2005, a Belgian female convert stunned the country and the world when she blew herself up in Baghdad in a failed suicide attack against U.S. forces. In Britain, people are still perplexed that one of the suspects arrested in the foiled transatlantic airline bomb was the son "of a Conservative Party activist." This growing trend of converts embracing radical Islamism has raised several questions about the role of Islam in radicalization.

Nevertheless, it not the conversion to Islam that is the prime factor in the new converts becoming terrorists. It is the group they associate with once they embrace Islam that creates the conditions conducive for radicalization. Radicalization, as Stefan Reichmuth, a professor of Islamic studies at the Ruhr University in Bochum, pointed out, occurs "in the context of acquaintances, the environment or the networks that one encounters after converting" (Deutsche Welle, September 11). Gudrun Ensslin, one of the leaders of the left-wing rebels of Germany's Red Army Faction, became radicalized only after she joined a group of disgruntled and angry middle-class youth who saw themselves as fighting the "arch capitalists." This daughter of a protestant pastor did not veer into extremism because of her religious background. She did so when she "fell in with a group of far-leftists unhappy with German society" (Deutsche Welle, September 11).

Clearly, young converts are more susceptible to the "anti-imperialist" dimension of transnational salafi

jihadism, as is shown by the small number of disaffected German nationals who came to find solace in jihadism and its revolutionary promise to exact vengeance on what it sees as a hegemonic and discriminatory Western system. It is, therefore, a mistake to view the jihadis' terrorist enterprise as emanating exclusively from religious absolutism. After all, the targets of the German suspects were not Christian landmarks, but the U.S. military air facility at Ramstein, an important transport hub for the U.S. war command and its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and U.S. and Uzbek consular facilities in Germany. The goal was to put pressure on both the German and Uzbek governments to close the Termez base in southern Uzbekistan. Germany uses the base for logistical support for its 3,000 soldiers in Afghanistan. A communiqué posted online on September 11, 2007 by the Islamic Jihad Union, a group affiliated with al-Qaeda which splintered from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, claimed that the IJU had intended to attack the United States and Uzbekistan because of their "injustice and brutal policies toward Muslims and Islam" (Spiegel Online, September 12).

These foiled plots and other incidents clearly show that unlike the 9/11 suicide pilots who used the country as a base to plan their terrorist missions, Germany is now "no longer only a retreat, but also an operations area," warned Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble. In his presentation of the government's report on extremism for 2006, Schäuble made it clear that "The biggest threat for the stability and security of Germany comes again from Islamic terrorism" (4). Even though the terror threat level in the country remains less critical than in other European countries involved in Iraq, law enforcement officials warn that in the eyes of the jihadists "Germany is classed as one of the so-called crusaders, the helpers of the United States and of Israel" (5). The 2005 annual report on the protection of the constitution warns that Germany's involvement in Afghanistan, the deployment of its marines in Somalia and its training of Iraqi officers make it part "of the Islamist terrorists' theatre of operations."

Yet, while Germany is by no means immune to home-grown terrorism like that which occurred in Great Britain on 7 July 2005, it is still a fact that the ideologies that spawn terrorism or radicalism in France and elsewhere in Europe have not found fertile ground in the country's Turkish immigrants who make up three quarters of the Muslim population. (6). The few terror suspects apprehended so far are of Arab origin or were German converts (Crisis Group, 2007). Unlike most of their Muslim coun-

European countries, Turkish laborers in Germany were not imported as former colonial subjects. Also, the background of the majority of Muslims in Germany differs significantly from those of Muslims in France, Britain, Spain and some other European countries. Where as in France, Muslims come predominantly from a North African background, especially from Algeria, an incubator of radicals, those in Germany come mostly from Turkey a secular and one of the few modern and democratic countries of the Arab and Muslim world. "We are rather lucky with our Turks who live here, who have known about the separation of religion and state since Ataturk. There is Fundamentalism in Turkey, but Turks do not generally feel that Saudis or Osama bin Laden are addressing them in particular," said North Rhine-Westphalia's integration minister (Crisis Group, 2007).

To be sure, Turkish Muslims are a diverse group that is divided in its practice and interpretation of Islam and political orientations. The relationship between the different subcategories is not always smooth as demonstrated by the sporadic clashes between Kurds and Turks. There are also major differences between groups that are accommodationists and those that are exclusivists (Warner & Wener, 2006). When in 2007 the DITIB (Turkish-Islamic Union for the Institution of Religion), the largest organization in Germany, joined forces with its rivals, the Islamic Council (IR), the Central Council of Muslims (ZMD) and the Association of Islamic Culture Centres (VIKZ) to institute a unified umbrella group, the Alevites and others refused to join the initiative. "We have a completely different religious understanding," said Ali Ertan Toprak, the General Secretary of the Alevite Community in Germany (Buck, 2007). Mr. Toprak also justified his groups' position on political grounds. "For us the DITIB is a state-run Turkish organization and the Islamic Council represents Milli Görüs." The latter is greatly suspected by German authorities for its fundamentalist affiliations and alleged anti-European tendencies. The IR, ZMD and VIKZ have also been investigated by German authorities for their Islamist ties and their alleged opposition to democratic pluralism and integration within German society.

But despite the rivalry between the different Turkish groups and the religious radicalization of some, the Turkish community has by far remained the least prone to violence or terrorism. Salafist ideologies have had difficulty penetrating the Turkish community. Movements like the Tabligh and the Muslim brotherhoods, for example, have had some success proselytizing within European Muslims

but their influence on the Turkish population remains insignificant. This, of course, does not mean that Turks are not affected by their second class social status or by the anti-imperialist propaganda of the salafi-jihadis. Since 2007, there has been a disturbing increase in jihadi literature, written in Turkish and distributed over the internet (The Economist Online, 2008). The recent arrest of two Turks implicated in a terrorist conspiracy heightened the level of concern about the potential radicalization of a population thought to be hitherto largely immune to armed activism. But despite these incidents, "the border between religion and politics, policed until very recently by the Turkish state, has been largely respected in Germany" (The Economist online, 2008).

According to the International Crisis Group, Islamic activism, with the exclusion of the Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüs (Islamic Community of the National Vision, IGMG), appeals far less to the Turkish Muslim element than it does to the rest of the Muslim minority. Despite the scare of Islamist ideologues exporting their creed to a marginalized Muslim minority, the federal Verfassungsschutz (Office for the Protection of the Constitution), the equivalent of Britain's MI5 and the U.S. FBI, puts the number of the supporters of the 28 Islamist organizations that operate in Germany at 32,150 in 2006. The number of supporters of Turkish Islamist groups stands at 27,250. The *Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüs* gets the largest share of support with around 26,500. Arab Islamist groups claim 3,350 supporters. The Muslim Brotherhood tops the list with around 1,300 supporters, the Lebanese Hezbollah comes second after MB with 900. As for *Jama'at Tabligh*, it has about 500 members, and Hamas 300 members (9).

Yet despite the fact that intelligence agencies have found little evidence of the association of Islamists with social unrest or jihadism, local and federal authorities are highly distrustful of Islamism in both its moderate and radical forms. "The number of Islamists is not the same thing as the number of potential terrorists, but Islamists have a vision of state order that we do not share... We do not want terrorists, but we also do not want Islamists," said Interior Minister Schauble (Crisis Group, 2007). The Verfassungsschutz keeps a close eye on all Islamist groups, including non-violent ones whom it accuses of fostering radicalization. This radicalization, however, failed to manifest itself during the French riots of 2005 and the 2006 Mohamed caricatures affair. Civic unrest or a spillover of violence did not occur.

There is no doubt that there are radical Islamists that

warrant close surveillance. It is estimated that the *Hilafet Devleti* movement, the biggest of the radical groups operating in Germany, has 750 members. The banned *Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami* (Islamic Liberation Party) has about 300 members. Hezbollah and Hamas count no more than a few hundred members. German officials put the number of supporters of the Iraqi Ansar al-Islam/Ansar al-Sunna and a handful of "non-aligned mujahideen" in the low hundreds. One to two percent of Islamists (400-600) are believed to be "ready to commit violence," but so are foreign leftist extremists, who are estimated to number 17,290 in Bavaria alone, and foreign extreme nationalists (8,430 members). All are described as potentially violent.

Notwithstanding the small number of radical Islamists, state officials lump all Islamists together as quintessentially undemocratic, oppressive and anti-Western. Many Germans believe that any accommodation toward the Islamists would constitute a dangerous betrayal of the values of the enlightenment and an appeasement of an Islamist foe whose rise is said to resemble the rise of the Third Reich (8). "This mass of devout people wants to take possession of its deadly infidel enemies; it wants to slaughter them and burn them," warns in dire terms violence researcher Wolfgang Sofsky (Misik, 2006). This hard-line exclusionary rhetoric which begins with getting the Islamist monolith in line with the universalist and static secular culture of the superior "real Germans" leads inevitably to cultural fundamentalism. There is a disturbing belief that good Muslims are the ones who do not practice their religion and suppress their Muslim identity. As in France and the rest of Europe, even Muslim female headgear, for example, is seen as an Islamist threat that needs to be combated. Many Germans view the headscarf as an inflammatory symbol of religious fanaticism that poses a mortal threat to the values of society. Calls are increasingly being made to free headscarf-wearing females from their "oppression" and "manipulation" by the Islamists. Those women who have challenged this perception are ridiculed for their backwardness and submission to the extremists. They are also branded as enemies of the social order that must be banished from civil service and ultimately from public view.

There is a tendency to conjure the worst case scenarios in which non-violent Islamists, who are believed to deceptively project themselves as victims of state paranoia and Islamophobia, turn into terrorists or at the very least troublemakers who instigate civic unrest. Much is made of the importance of dialogue and consultation with the Muslim community, but the crucial thing, as

Rita Süßmuth states, "is that we stop going on about how essential dialogue is, and that we actually get down to doing it in practice" (Sey, 2005). This former president of the Bundestag, the German parliament, is very critical of the policy of exclusion that the German authorities have embraced for decades with regards to organizations they suspect of promoting a "legalistic Islamism."

Islamist groups deny the state's accusations. The Islamic Association Milli Görüs rejects the authorities claim that the organization is an extremist Islamist movement. "What activities among the wide range found within our infrastructure are directed against the German constitutional order?" asks Oguz Ücücü, the Secretary General of the IGMG. For Ücücü, the latest report by the Bundesverfassungsschutz fails to document in any way how IGMG violates the constitution and threatens the internal cohesion of society. "What have we been concretely accused of in order to have our association named in the intelligence agency report? There is a need for hard facts! And, just as in the past, I don't see them" (Sollich, 2006). Indeed, IGMG has at one instance, in November 2005, successfully challenged in court the security agency of the largest German federal state, North Rhine-Westphalia, to retract its accusations that the organization has not distanced itself from anti-democratic and anti-Semitic comments made by people associated with the IGMG's sister organizations in Turkey.

The security agency also had to admit that it made errors in translating and transcribing comments from Turkish into German. Some experts have already criticized the depiction of Islamist movements like the IGM in the report as "tendentious and unbalanced." "Facts which fit the picture of an anti-constitutional, rigidly hierarchical organisation are included, facts which don't are simply ignored," writes Werner Schiffauer (Schiffauer, 2004). To be sure, experts have been at odds over whether the organization is radical or not. But stigmatizing non-violent Islamists through exclusionary policies will unfortunately do nothing to isolate radical Islamists and eliminate their alien threats. While it is true that non-violent Islamists can become radicalized, this radicalization is not automatic. It is indiscriminate crackdowns and arbitrary humiliations that might drive non-violent Islamists into the hands of the radicals.

Conclusion

The rhetoric about the rising tide of fundamentalism overtaking Germany engenders only more fear and

paranoia of the young, alienated Muslims that are poor, ill-educated and tempted by crime and radical Islam. As demonstrated above, the majority of Muslims, especially those of Turkish origin, have so far resisted embracing the anti-systemic ideologies that penetrated France, Britain, Spain and other European countries. But it would be a mistake to think that most Turks would indefinitely shun violence as a means to protest against state discrimination or widespread Islamophobia. As the French case has taught us, the failure of political Islamism aggravated by political underrepresentation and the disengagement of Muslims from the institutional space can create a dangerous void and an organizational vacuum that can be exploited by violent jihadists. The arrest of two Turks implicated in a terrorist conspiracy and the growth of Turkish jihadi literature are examples of the potential for radicalization within the Turkish community.

The demonization of Islam and Islamism only deepen the level of distrust between the Muslim communities and the German nationals. A number of surveys have shown that a substantial number of Germans admit to being preoccupied with anything Muslim that they would feel uncomfortable living in districts populated by Muslims. To assuage people's fears and concerns, the German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg in 2006 introduced a new citizenship test for Muslims to make sure that they share German principles. The irony of the test is that many Germans would fail to pass it. Given that a large number of Muslims in Germany were denied easy access to citizenship until very recently, their existence in Germany is increasingly becoming conditional upon the espousal of particular beliefs and fidelity to values that even the most patriotic Germans might not know or agree with. This emphasis on Muslims' loyalty to Germany's "fundamental principles and values" is the right of every country, but requirements of ideological conformity (are you truly with us or against us?) with moral dilemmas are difficult to comprehend and even violate the German *Grundgesetz* (constitution) which stipulates "freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom of creed, religious or ideological." It is counter-productive to threaten potential ostracism through naturalization and a foreigners' law as punishment for the "sin" of refusing to adopt an imposed ideological uniformity on moral dilemmas that looks more like absolute assimilationism than integration.

Calls for cultural homogeneity and linking Muslims' acceptance in Germany to forced assimilation have overshadowed far more important and relevant issues that

deal with economic, social and educational marginalization. Germany's three-tier system educational system, for example, as Vernor Muñoz Villalobos, the Special Rapporteur on education issues for the Commission on Human Rights, reported promotes "social inequalities" and relegated immigrant children to "third-rate, dead-end schools" (9).

The Path Ahead

Pressures from within (Islam) and without (globalization and European integration) have made Germans and French feel apprehensive about their national identity and culture. Both countries are visibly struggling to mitigate the potentially explosive mix of nationalism and fear of the Muslim "stranger," while defining citizenship for their marginalized and disenfranchised immigrants. The issue is no longer the building of 'defensive citadels' of "Frenchness" or 'Germanness', particularly since Germany has finally come to grips with the reality that the *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) are there to stay. The challenge for Germany and France today is to define what kinds of values are essential for their countries' secular model of society and what are negotiable.

French and German politicians have up until now been consumed by what they consider as the urgent necessity of taming and institutionalizing Islam within a much more securitized and secularized process. But it is becoming increasingly clear that the development of such strictly controlled Islam will not stymie the growth of radical tendencies within the Muslim community. Government-sponsored religious organizations will do little to isolate radical Muslims and address the main problems of disenfranchisement and lack of opportunity that second and third generation immigrants suffer from. It is the promotion of Muslim involvement in politics and their meaningful involvement in political activities at the local level that can lessen political disturbances and restore some credibility to the European democratic model. This, in addition to a sincere focus on education and job creation, would be important steps toward empowering neglected minorities and helping them climb the ladder of success. Major efforts need to be made to tackle socioeconomic problems and put an end to state toleration of Islamophobia and discrimination against Muslims in the same way the governments laudably combat the scourge of anti-Semitism (10). A sincere and impartial effort to resolve the Palestinian predicament and end foreign adventures in Muslim lands would certainly decrease support among immigrant youths for anti-system groups, violent or otherwise.

This article was first published in the peer-reviewed journal: International Political Science Review.

The New Disarmament Discussion

By Sharon Squassoni

Nuclear disarmament appears to be on track for a political makeover. Serious commentators have begun to discuss what it might take to actually get to zero nuclear weapons, a question that is no longer the exclusive purview of grassroots activists. No one believes the goal will be achieved any time soon. But a consensus has emerged that the project of disarmament must be taken seriously if the world is to avoid further proliferation of nuclear weapons, perhaps into the hands of terrorists.

Until about two years ago, few but the most ardent anti-nuclear groups advocated outright elimination of nuclear weapons. Arms control advocates lobbied for fewer strategic nuclear weapons, less threatening alert postures, a continued ban on nuclear testing, and limited or no modernization of existing stockpiles, among other things. When cornered, US government officials would note that Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) calls for *negotiations in good faith* on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. In short, there was a safety valve on just how far the project of nuclear disarmament could proceed and certainly no timetable for reaching any particular goals.

Visualizing a world free of nuclear weapons belonged in the same category as eradicating hunger or cancer or poverty—a nice idea with overwhelming practical limitations. There has always been a host of reasons not to eliminate nuclear weapons. For example, the technology cannot be disinvented. Or, the elimination of nuclear arms could introduce strategic instabilities and possibly make conventional war more likely. It might even induce states that now do not have nuclear weapons to develop them.

More important, the security order of the past half-century has been based on the logic of nuclear deterrence. Talking realistically about eliminating nuclear weapons has bordered therefore on doctrinal heresy. (In contrast, no one argues that hunger, cancer, or poverty have their uses.)

Trading a “nuclear peace” for uncertain outcomes seemed far too risky. Yet, as Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store remarked at an international conference in Oslo last February, the Achilles heel of thinking about nuclear weapons has been the false assumption that the status quo is less risky than change.

Terrorism focuses the mind

What has shifted? First, the language of disarmament has been adopted by senior American statesmen and, abroad, by senior government officials. It is not clear yet that this language will be adopted within the US government, which, if it happened, could be the first step toward setting the machinery of disarmament in motion. But the careful logic set out in the past two years cannot be dismissed as a pipe dream of the political left.

Second, the impetus for substantially reducing nuclear forces has been linked directly to concerns about proliferation and terrorism. The 9/11 terrorist attacks; nuclear tests by Pakistan, India, and North Korea; and Iran’s refusal to abide by the resolutions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and United Nations Security Council have raised the stakes in efforts to tamp down proliferation.

In its simplest form, the idea gaining momentum is that more weapons—regardless of whether they are amassed in existing nuclear weapon states or new nuclear weapon states—provide more potential access points for terrorists. A more sophisticated version of the argument suggests that proliferation of nuclear weapons to new states renders an already complex deterrence calculation unmanageable, thereby degrading the deterrent value of existing nuclear weapons.

This connection between disarmament and nonproliferation and terrorism is significant for several reasons. In the past, foreign policy realists have argued that disarmament steps were irrelevant to other countries’ calculations concerning their aspirations for nuclear weapons, while nonproliferation advocates argued that such steps were still relevant for the balance and sustainability of the nonproliferation regime as a whole. In other words, in order to get agreement to strengthen nonproliferation (such as enhanced inspections), it was necessary politically to show progress on disarmament. Realists appear now to be agreeing that disarmament steps may be vital to shoring up nonproliferation efforts.

Tying disarmament to reducing the threat of terrorist access to nuclear material or weapons is a new twist. Although this link formed the basis for the cooperative threat-reduction programs begun in 1991 in the then-Soviet Union, it has not been applied to other nuclear weapon states. In general, observers have assumed that nuclear material is protected most securely when it is in nuclear weapons, in contrast to material stored at universities, hospitals, and commercial power plants.

A highly publicized incident in August 2007—when six cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads were mistakenly loaded onto a US Air Force plane and flown across the country without authorities being aware that they were missing—underscores the foolhardiness of that assumption. The looming threats of proliferation and terrorism havelent new urgency to the project of disarmament.

The four statesmen step in

In January 2007, four senior American statesmen—the former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defense William Perry, and Senator Sam Nunn—published an op-ed essay in *The Wall Street Journal* entitled “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons.” The choice of venue—the conservative *Wall Street Journal*—and the inclusion particularly of Kissinger sent a compelling message that nuclear disarmament might actually be politically feasible.

The four statesmen essentially argued that the threats posed by nuclear arsenals in the form of proliferation into the hands of dangerous states or terrorists may ultimately be greater than the risks posed by their abolition. They did not reject nuclear deterrence, but suggested that “reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.” In response to the op-ed, the former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev wrote: “It is becoming clearer that nuclear weapons are no longer a means of achieving security; in fact, with every passing year they make our security more precarious.”

Part of the appeal of the four statesmen’s approach was its grounding in the vision of eliminating nuclear weapons that was shared at Reykjavik 20 years ago by Gorbachev and then-President Ronald Reagan—two cold warriors at the epicenter of nuclear competition. The essay recalled the shock and hope of the Reagan-Gorbachev

vision—shock from experts in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and hope from people all around the world. Another part of its appeal was its remarkable lack of ideology. Like a reluctant suitor, this disarmament campaign, which might more comfortably be described as a nuclear security campaign, has attempted to steer a course between shock and hope, particularly by refusing to disavow deterrence.

Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn called for making the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world a joint enterprise among nuclear weapon states. The steps they advocated are well-known, including reducing alert levels, substantially cutting nuclear force levels, working toward a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), halting the production of fissile material for weapons globally, and improving the security of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material worldwide. If the four authors had simply called for taking those steps, rather than placing them in the framework of a world free of nuclear weapons, their article might have elicited curiosity about the breadth or depth of their agreement, but not the level of excitement it has generated thus far.

A year later, in a follow-on article in *The Wall Street Journal*, the four statesmen called for making disarmament a practical enterprise among non-nuclear nations as well. This time, their recommendations primarily focused on US and Russian actions but also fleshed out steps toward a test ban and efforts to manage the risks of the nuclear fuel cycle.

This post-ideological campaign—some might say it is a perfect fit for the Obama administration—has not argued that the vision of a world without nuclear weapons is right or moral. Instead, it has argued that the vision is necessary to energize actions and to build the international trust and cooperation necessary for those actions. Coming from what some call the “realist” security elite, it has the very real potential to effect change.

A wider, international campaign has also begun, officially unveiled in Paris in December 2008. Drawing from military, political, religious, and business communities, the Global Zero campaign seeks to generate support among world leaders for disarmament steps. Members of Global Zero thus far include former foreign ministers and retired generals from the United States, United Kingdom, Pakistan, and India. The group hopes to hold a world

summit of 500 leaders in January 2010. A key question is whether the campaign will catch on in the relevant governments.

Will other states go for it?

Gauging support for a world free of nuclear weapons is difficult. The five nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT all have expressed support for the general commitment under the treaty's Article VI to pursue nuclear disarmament. But as the late Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme remarked 30 years ago, "Everybody pays lip service to disarmament, but the issues are clouded by technical details and secrecy, left to the experts." Has much changed?

The United Kingdom has certainly gone furthest in rhetoric. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown has called for accelerating disarmament among nuclear weapon states, preventing proliferation to new states, and ultimately achieving a world that is free of nuclear weapons. In June 2008, the "UK Four"—former Foreign and Defense Secretaries Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen, and George Robertson—published an article in *The Times* of London entitled "Start Worrying and Learn To Ditch the Bomb." Their starting point was simple and stark: The more nuclear material in circulation, the greater the risk it could fall into the wrong hands. They suggested nuclear disarmament is possible (but stopped short of saying it is necessary), and chose to describe a world free of nuclear weapons as an "ultimate aspiration."

Actions may speak louder than words, however. The United Kingdom recently has embarked on a path that, according to British officials, is making their country a "disarmament laboratory." The government has tasked the Atomic Weapons Establishment with detailing key stages in verifying disarmament, including the authentication of warheads, chain of custody problems in sensitive nuclear weapons facilities, and monitored storage of dismantled nuclear weapons. In addition, experts have been working on provisions to manage access to sensitive nuclear facilities.

The British government commissioned a study in 2008 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies on the requirements for disarmament. "Abolishing Nuclear Weapons," a paper by George Perkovich and James Acton, explores how to create the necessary security conditions for

disarmament as well as measures to verify and enforce it. The UK has also set in motion an effort among the five nuclear weapon states' laboratories to explore technical verification issues.

French officials have steered clear of supporting abolition of nuclear weapons. President Nicolas Sarkozy, with the United States, refused in 2005 to reaffirm the goal of total elimination of nuclear arsenals that nuclear weapon states had made at the NPT 2000 review conference. On the other hand, Sarkozy announced in March 2008 that France would reduce its nuclear arsenal, and he urged support for the entry into force of the CTBT (which France has signed and ratified), as well as a global ban on fissile material production for weapons. Ultimately, however, France presently views its nuclear deterrent as vital protection against a wide range of threats.

Official Russian rhetoric has been slightly more supportive. In a speech to the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament in February 2008, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that many of the steps recommended by Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn were "in line with Russia's initiatives." But then he proceeded to warn that US efforts to deploy its global anti-ballistic missile system would affect Russian decisions about strategic offensive weapons, footnoting the fact that limitations on strategic arms may expire soon. Sergei Kislyak, the Russian ambassador to the United States, told *Arms Control Today* in November 2008 that Russia supports the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, but he stressed the complexity of the process. Clearly, a follow-up to the 1991 strategic arms reduction treaty, which will expire at the end of 2009, is a critical first step in the entire process.

It is not clear how the Russians' actions will compare to their rhetoric. For example, Foreign Minister Lavrov introduced a draft treaty at the February Conference on Disarmament to eliminate all short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, essentially an extension of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement. Yet the proposed deployment of 10 US missile interceptors to Poland in late 2008 prompted Russia to declare that it would station Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. Critics have noted that the Iskander's range can be extended to the point that it would violate the INF treaty.

Another issue is Russia's modernization of its strategic

systems, made possible by strong economic gains of the past few years. Some analysts note that this modernization does not necessarily preclude steps toward disarmament, since Russia might feel more comfortable negotiating from a stronger position.

China also is modernizing its nuclear forces. But its policies and practices have shown restraint in the deployment of nuclear weapons. And Beijing has long stated its support for the “complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons,” including the conclusion of a treaty for that purpose. Any attempt to bring China into multilateral negotiations will likely depend on significant US-Russian advances first. According to Chinese official policy: “The two countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special and primary responsibilities for nuclear disarmament. They should . . . create conditions for achieving the ultimate goal of complete and thorough nuclear disarmament.”

China has committed to “no first use” of nuclear weapons, and has urged other nuclear weapon states to do the same—including abandoning deterrence based on a first use of nuclear weapons. In addition, China supports early negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, as do most of the other nuclear weapon states.

Any disarmament project would have to reel in the three states outside the NPT that have nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, and Israel. India’s commitment to a world without nuclear weapons is longstanding, but like China, its efforts to modernize and expand its arsenal create doubts about matching actions with words. At the 2008 UN General Assembly, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh suggested a number of practical measures toward disarmament. These include: reaffirming the unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapon states to the goal of completely eliminating nuclear arms; reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines; and adopting measures to reduce the risks of accidental war, for example, by taking nuclear systems off alert status.

The Indian prime minister also called for efforts to negotiate new agreements, including a global pact among nuclear weapon states on a policy of no-first-use of nuclear arms, and a universal and legally binding ban on the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. In addition, Singh proposed a convention on prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons and creating a plan to destroy nuclear weapons.

Such a convention, he urged, should lead to the global, nondiscriminatory, and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame.

Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari recently created a stir when he suggested that Pakistan would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a war with India. But it is not clear that the Pakistani military also supports this significant change in nuclear doctrine. Pakistan has continued to expand its nuclear arsenal, including building new reactors to make more weapons-grade plutonium. Although Pakistani officials rhetorically support disarmament, they are likely to throw up roadblocks to progress on the CTBT and fissile materials ban. Meanwhile, Israel’s nuclear weapons remain under wraps, making it difficult for Israeli officials to say much about their own nuclear arms or their views on disarmament. They have, however, been very clear about one thing: Efforts to rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction can only be successful in the context of durable peace and transparency.

Into the belly of the beast

The vision of a world without nuclear weapons has taken shape outside of governments, but is increasingly creeping inside governments. The election of Barack Obama holds particular promise in this regard. During the presidential campaign, Obama stated his intention to make the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide a central element of US nuclear policy. He declared that “a world without nuclear weapons is profoundly in America’s interest and the world’s interest. It is our responsibility to make the commitment, and to do the hard work to make this vision a reality.”

In particular, Obama promised to “initiate a high-level dialogue among all the declared nuclear weapon states on how to make their nuclear capabilities more transparent, create greater confidence, and move toward meaningful reductions and the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons.” In the interim, Obama and his national security team are committed to maintaining a strong deterrent while stopping the development of new nuclear weapons. As part of a plan to control and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons around the world, President-elect Obama has called for securing, within four years, all nuclear materials in the 50 countries that have them, and phasing out highly enriched uranium in the civil fuel cycle. He wants to negotiate radical reductions in US and Russian nuclear stockpiles, and to lower current

alert levels of deployed nuclear forces. He has called for negotiating a verifiable global ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons, and a global ban on all intermediate-range missiles. Obama has proposed the creation of a new global nuclear energy architecture that includes an international nuclear fuel bank, international fuel cycle centers, and reliable fuel supply assurances.

And he wants to increase funding for IAEA inspections and safeguards. President-elect Obama has also stated that he will ask the US Senate to ratify the CTBT as soon as it is practical to do so, and will launch a diplomatic effort to get other states, such as India and Pakistan, to support the treaty. It is too soon to tell how nonproliferation and disarmament priorities will compete against other more urgent economic, foreign, and security policy priorities in the Obama administration. But even creating a favorable impression in 2009 could buy time to win support further down the road.

Thorny challenges

Nuclear issues have a way of sticking around a long time. Fifty years after the dawn of nuclear energy, no country has been able to decide where to permanently store nuclear waste. Nuclear fusion is, and has been for a while, about 50 years off into the future. And the disarmament project was born in 1945 and is still in its infancy. Will the campaign for nuclear disarmament become a movement? Is that necessary? Will it be embraced by the states most important for its success? Several critics of the four statesmen's approach have suggested that convincing Americans will be the easiest part. The challenges facing this project are daunting and will need to be whittled away over time. Political will to work on disarmament must be sustained for long periods, which will be difficult. Technical issues too will require sustained attention. Politically, the top priority will be to renew cooperation between the United States and Russia, at a time when US-Russian relations have reached a new low. President Dmitri Medvedev has continued to urge the United States to drop its plans to deploy missile defenses in the Czech Republic and Poland, but he also has interpreted President elect Obama's muted response so far as favorable, according to press reports. Medvedev specifically has expressed hope that the Obama administration will help restore US-Russian relations.

Technical challenges depend on a host of decisions about the scope of disarmament and how it would be carried out. Would the scope cover warheads, nuclear material,

and/or delivery vehicles? What level of confidence would be necessary in verifying declarations of stockpiles and the destruction of warheads? How can sensitive information be protected so that nuclear secrets are not divulged? Many of these technical problems will require years of study before any decisions are reached; the studying should begin now. Other technical challenges that need to be sorted out concern how to deter and detect any proliferation after nuclear weapons have been eliminated—in other words, the risk of a country “breaking out” from zero nuclear weapons. For those that favor countries' maintaining a hedging capability, this is less of an issue. For others, the continued use of nuclear energy in a world that has far fewer or zero nuclear weapons may present significant technical challenges. All types of nuclear fuel—whether reactors use natural uranium, low-enriched uranium, or plutonium—require some sensitive fuel cycle facilities.

Both uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing plants, which separate out plutonium from waste products, can be used to make reactor fuel or fuel for bombs. In a world that has fewer nuclear weapons, the incentives to use civilian nuclear facilities for clandestine purposes may be greater since the advantages to be gained would be greater. This is why all disarmament proposals stress the importance of enhancing controls on nuclear material worldwide. This would be a challenge even if the status of nuclear energy remained exactly as it is today. However, industry experts predict a major expansion.

In the past few years, dozens of countries have stated that they plan to develop nuclear energy as an antidote to dependence on oil and natural gas and as a greener energy solution in the context of global climate change. If all the states that now have plans actually followed through on them, current nuclear reactor capacity could double by 2030. If states were serious about using nuclear energy to help significantly reduce carbon dioxide emissions, nuclear capacity might triple or quadruple. Nuclear power, moreover, would no longer be concentrated in the relatively advanced 31 nations that now operate reactors in North America, Europe, and Asia, but would spread among possibly 80 countries with widely divergent economic, social, and political development. The real problem would be if the sensitive fuel-making capabilities of enrichment and reprocessing also spread to significantly more countries. Technical and political solutions to these technologies' proliferation risks have so far been relatively unappealing to most countries, although work on this undoubtedly will continue.

The ultimate aspiration

It would be wrong to suggest that a consensus has emerged on abolishing nuclear weapons. Yet recognition is growing among experts and some government officials that the risks of nuclear arsenals may outweigh their benefits, given the security challenges posed by proliferation and terrorism. This is an enormously different environment from the one that existed in 1946, when the US government proposed to eliminate nuclear weapons under the Baruch Plan. It is also enormously different from the 1980s environment that spawned the nuclear freeze movement.

Moving toward the goal of zero nuclear weapons will require sustained engagement by experts inside and outside governments. It might also require, as Palme suggested decades ago, a groundswell of support from people across the world. Most important, it will require committed political leadership and vision to create the security structures that will enable states confidently to reduce and eventually to eliminate their dependence on nuclear weapons for security.

This article by Sharon Squassoni was first published in Current History