President Bush’s October 6 remarks on the Global War on Terror, Ayman al-Zawahiri’s July 9 letter to Abu Mus`ab Zarqawi released in October, and interpretations of popular responses to the simultaneous suicide bombings in Amman, Jordan on November 9 – each indicators of new strategies in jihad against the West, and the global war waged against that jihad. President Bush should be concerned that a list of terrorist actions undertaken since September 11, 2001 is far longer than the ten instances of American success in foiling acts of terror that he mentioned in that speech. The franchising of jihadi violence is clearly something to be concerned about. His more specific concentration on Islamist terror in these remarks is to me, a positive sign of recognition that while terrorism is practiced globally and does not emanate from Islam, we must understand the regeneration, franchising, and longevity of jihadi movements. Since so many of these movements have emerged, just as predicted by Hosni Mubarak back in 2003, [2] it appears that the US and other nations must scrutinize their new strategies against these movements’ “new jihad.”

Can either our current strategies, or a new one deal with the export of jihad from country to country? Al-Zawahiri describes, in his letter to al-Zarqawi, the relocation of jihad from Iraq into Egypt and the Levant, now that its former haven in Afghanistan has been vitally disrupted. That parallels an earlier migration of Egyptian Islamic Jihad members to Afghanistan. So do al-Zawahiri’s pragmatic suggestions for relocation fully explain the violent attacks in the Sinai in July 2005 and October 2004 [3] and in Cairo in April 2005? [4] Local (non-global) Egyptian Islamist groups refrained from violence since the Luxor attacks of 1997. Yet there is disagreement about whether “al-Qa’ida” was involved or merely inspired these attacks. Similarly, the 7/7/05 attacks in London were not prevented, nor apparently preventable by the ongoing tactics against jihad. They illustrated, once again that jihadi cells with little or no direction from al-Qa’ida might easily organize attacks. We badly need to understand why the jihadist message resonates with new listeners, whether Sinai bedouin, Cairenes, or English-born Muslims. What measures should the US or other nations adopt to dampen the zeal for jihad?

And how well are we reading public reaction to the war on terror? For instance the Western media reported that many Jordanians honked their automobile horns and marched in the streets to denounce terrorism after the Amman attacks. [5] However, the Western media did not widely report that some Jordanians believed the attacks were engineered by Israelis. That conspiracy theory – similar to one that circulates about 9/11 -- was not even put to rest with the release of details about the Amman bombers. [6] It was bolstered somewhat by Zarqawi’s statement that Israelis and intelligence were his target, not Muslims and wedding celebrants. [7]

In his letter, which some experts suspect to be a fake, al-Zawahiri broached concern to Zarqawi that the Muslim masses would cease sympathizing with al-Qaeda’s struggle after witnessing attacks on Shi`i civilians and the brutal videotaped beheadings of captives. Perhaps the terrorists fragmentation or lack of unity, which has been expressed, at least in Iraq [8] would also fray at their support. Seasoned al-Zawahiri, survivor of the rout from Afghanistan should be concerned about wasting the momentum of jihad. Yet if the jihad is in trouble, why are there new attacks? And why do the experts disagree about the tenacity of the new jihad?

What exactly is this new jihad? Is it a modernization or a morphing of Islam’s production of purist offshoots? Why is this contemporary version different from any other? Is it simply that today’s actors developed global rather than local, or irredentist aims? [9] When Ottoman forces laid siege to Vienna (a failed campaign) weren’t their objectives ‘global’? Why do we need such labels for militant ambitions?

The new jihad draws in some ways from the language of an Islamic awakening (sahwa Islamiyya) that swept across the Muslim world since the 1970s. This awakening has metamorphasized; it has in turn, been influenced by this “new jihad,” since the mid-1980s or 1990s. It is represented by groups like the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, the Da`wa Party of Iraq, Hizbullah of Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, or individuals like Egyptian televangelist `Amr Khaled. It speaks to a battle between `asala (authenticity, but not necessarily traditionalism) and mu`asara (modernity) as embodied in globalization, commercialization, secularism and the perceived demise of a family-oriented society. It calls for increased social justice and religiosity.

Many moderates and Islamist extremists share anti-materialist ideas and call for reinterpretation or renovation of Islamic traditions. The new jihad goes further, and promotes a global battle against Western nations and local “apostate” governments, without exempting civilians, whereas those who believe merely in a spiritual awakening may refute violence, or even political change. This is confusing. Members of the militant World Islamic Front may appear and act at will without coordination by a central authority. They ally when necessary with other Muslim groups with local – not global – ambitions. Their vision of an emirate, or caliphate would not revert to seventh-century Arabia, it would surpass it.

The new jihad promotes a new moral code, a method of internalizing Islamist values: an elevation of the “new Islamic” man or woman. [10] The new jihad illustrates an understanding of the media, of Muslim youth and their sensitivities. The new jihad invents its own shari`ah (Islamic law) breaking with classical doctrines of jihad and the law of nations by torturing and killing Peoples of the Book, and other Muslims. [11]

After the classical age, Muslim modernist reformers approached jihad with a cognizance of the military and political supremacy of the West. These thinkers narrowed the rationale for jihad. It was valid only when one was prevented from carrying out the duties (or pillars) of Islam). Many spoke of jihad’s divisions into two forms: lesser (military) and greater (personal striving or goal-setting). Wahhabism, the form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia and some other Gulf states decried the “demotion” of jihad’s importance, as did the extremist Islamists. [12]

Hence, central claims or characteristics of the new “jihad” are:

• its promotion of battle against the West and local “apostate” governments and civilians;
• its malleability. Groups aiming at the “far enemy” (the U.S., other Western nations, and Israel) may ally with groups who primarily combat the “near enemy”
• it is required, and cannot be bounded by a peace treaty as was true of the classical definition;
• it requires tarbiyya, more than ta`lim. Ta`lim means education in the sense of enlightenment. Tarbiyya involves training and socialization, and thus, military information, strategy, rationalizations for violence, and a construction and glorification of jihad and jihadi history
• it calls for an end to secularism, and the transformation of Muslim societies, cleansing them of doctrinal innovation. Democracy is rejected insofar as it promotes secularism
• it calls for the withdrawal of Western military forces, political and economic influence from Muslim lands, as well as international agencies like the United Nations, and the World Bank.

Problems with Strategic Responses

In devising a new strategy against terrorism intended to combat this new jihad, US policy-makers adopted definitions that were simultaneously too broad and too narrow. They also ignored or seemed incapable of learning some tactical lessons from the experiences of foreign governments like Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Algeria, Pakistan, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan or Iran with regard to salafi-jihadism, or Islamist opposition. I am not claiming that these governments successfully dealt with this problem that had arisen since the 1970s, but that measures we could roughly term “carrot,” “stick,” and “denial” have all yielded different kinds of responses which have been closely studied. Without any consensus about the way to redress a new jihad, or more generally, the political and social potential of the Middle East and Muslim world, we lack a global forum for informed discussion of all of this with the possible exception of academia, where crafting policy is of less concern. As a result, it seems that both the US and its allies are revisiting some of the problematic tactics previously utilized by those nations’ paramilitaries.

A war on terror is too broad when it fails to consider the specific ideology in question -- the Islamist militant strand. The initial statements on the Global War on Terror lumped criminals and terrorists of all ilk together without regard to ideology. But Islamists are not precisely, or even very much like drug cartels or other groups that utilize terror as means of obtaining profit. Also, sequencing and the definition of a global popular will to engage in a war on terror must be considered. Western as well as secularist Muslim governments want to provide evidence of timely strategic victories, not least to ensure continuing public support. But the Islamists’ view of time is dissimilar to most Americans’ or Europeans’. They can wait, or continue insurgencies for ten or twenty years, or even decades. [13] There is no defeat for them, only martyrdom. The broader revival that challenges a vision of politics supreme over faith is going to continue. And the new jihad will remain an element in this overall process.

On the other hand, strategists have focused too narrowly by targeting al-Qaeda and a small number of close associates as the primary enemy. Highlighting differences between al-Qaeda and world jihad networks and other organizations with more limited territorial objectives would allow the United States to claim strategic victory when any of these few groups are eliminated.

However, as new jihadist organizations emerge, Muslims are encountering an intensified Western interventionism at home, and difficulties abroad. Many lack exposure to America or Europe, even other Muslim countries and relatively few Americans are sufficiently informed about Islam or the Muslim world. Post 9/11 measures in the US and post 7/7/05 policies in the UK are making it impossible for many ordinary Muslims, students, businessmen -- people with good will toward the West -- to travel, study, do business, or receive medical treatment in the US. In US, the implementation of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System delayed the application process. At a recent policy forum addressing educational exchanges, Ambassador Cresencio Arcos, Director of International Affairs at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security “acknowledged that some of the security measures put into place after 9/11 were “targeted against the very people we were trying to reach out to.” [14]

Meanwhile, Iraqis, Saudis, Jordanians, Egyptians, Syrians, Lebanese and others are encountering American calls for democratization, or rapid reform of their home region. These ideas are as yet only partially articulated. In Iraq, for instance, while a democratic system of representation is being shaped, it is not entirely clear what role shari’a, Islamic law will play in family law courts or political discourse, or how a negative sectarianism can be overcome. In Egypt it is not clear if America supports a pluralism that will include political parties like the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudis fear that a too-rapid democratization will similarly empower conservatives and Islamists, or destabilize the country. Most importantly, all over the region, there is concern about democratization that is formulated according to an American blueprint.

Until a less one-sided form of communication about democratization ensues, or more dialogue is established about other American policy objectives in the region, regional actors will regard with suspicion the U.S’s stated aim to deny sanctuary to terrorists, or the elimination of, in President Bush’s words “the conditions that feed radicalism and the ideologies of murder.” [15] The US has expressed other admirable sentiments – like addressing tyranny and despair with the hopes of disabling support for jihad. It is very important that these aims do not take a back seat to the preservation of regimes that promise to rein in Islamist radicalism

Related to this disjuncture in perspectives is the idea that the Global War on Terror is actually a US War on Islam. This sentiment is expressed by Muslims in the region and some in the West. Muslims base their claims on Western ideological attacks on Islam, as a civilization or a religion, as well as specific actions against fellow Muslims. It does not help when they face new heightened security procedures, are denied jobs, face discrimination, or see local mosques attacked or investigated. While hate crimes against Muslims in the US descended from the 1717 incidents reported in the first six months following 9/11 to 141 in 2004, a high number of civil rights cases were filed last year, and a strong increase was reported in detentions, searches/seizures, interrogations and “unreasonable arrests.” [16]

Western experts have suggested that moderate Muslims be supported while attacking radicals. That might be a beneficial way of proceeding except that the Islamic awakening’s impact has been to blur the distinctions between the two on some issues. Here, we need to recognize that as in Christianity, those who share an Islamic faith may disagree on elements of practice, theology, and the degree to which other Muslims should regulate their behavior or beliefs. Also, Muslims who argue for a re-opening of ijtihad, a juridical concept, or the decoupling of martyrdom from jihad, or even the idea that a Muslim woman can lead prayer are provocative to other Muslims. Most of all, it should not be up to non-Muslims to determine the direction of an already complex faith.

Eliminating Leaders, Clerical Inspiration and Recruits .

If one aspect of our new strategy against the new jihad was to effectively transform its operating environment, and that is not proceeding smoothly, then what about other aspects of our new strategy? How well are we targeting the new jihad’s leadership, or recruitment? As measured in specific attacks since 9/11, it seems that Islamist terrorism has greatly increased, given hundreds of incidents in scores of countries. [17] Cutting off the heads of a hydra is easier said than done.

Here we need to examine the track record of some ally nations. Israel utilized what they termed “targeted eliminations” [18] against political and military leadership of organizations like Islamic Jihad and Hamas. The killing of Hamas’ quadraplegic leader, Shaykh Yasin garnered very different reactions from Israelis or Palestinians. The attack probably lent even more support to the group, and that has been followed by political failures and perceived corruption of the Fatah elements of the Palestinian Authority. Similarly, Israel’s use of collective punishment against Palestinians served a public relations function for the government, but created long-term resentment, and even heightened militancy.

While in the short-term, targeted eliminations do prevent the planning and functional operation of organizations, the broader front of the war on terror must then meet the challenge of new groups inspired by the “martyrdom” of fallen leaders. So, simply checking off names on a list of Bin Ladin-associated, or al-Zarqawi-associated operatives, or those of the al-Qa’ida fi-l-Jazirah al-`Arabiyyah in Saudi Arabia did not prevent the attacks in Amman, nor the second Bali attacks, nor the ongoing waves of violence against Iraqi civilians and police and army recruits. This is because jihadi leaders from Sayyid Qutb, Shukri Mustafa, Muhammad`Abd al-Salam Faraj, al-Zawahiri, Usama bin Ladin to Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi have manipulated and enlarged the legitimacy of particular themes of the new jihad. Until these ideas can be delegitimized, or rendered less compelling to future recruits, leaders and their human environment, the new jihad will probably continue drawing in those who bear grievances against the West and their own governments’ policies.

This leads us to the public attempts to discredit the ideas of Islamist leaders or clerics who inspire them. President Parvez Musharref recently suggested that the war on terrorists is being won, and that we “should not pay too much attention to the thinking of” these militants, [19] but I disagree. First, we need to remember that clerics had maintained some independence from, as well as the right to religiously advise, political leaders. Modern secularist Muslim states sought to control their freedom of speech and bin Ladin has accused state-appointed or recognized `ulama of being government lackeys. So when U.S. (or Muslim governments) declare that certain Islamic leaders are legitimate while others are not, we replicate the jihadis own behavior. They divide the world into good Muslims who support their cause and bad Muslims and infidels who do not. We and our allies are trying to divide the believers and clerics into those who support our aims in the GWOT and echo our sentiments and those who do not. But the cleric’s function is different than that of a political leader or a foreign power, in that he must speak spiritual truths, or provide legal guidance even if they are politically inconvenient. And it is important that the Muslim world draw on or renew its tradition of philosophical pluralism and tolerance, and seek to convince rather than to outlaw.

Targeting clerics who inspire jihadists acknowledges the power of ideology in this struggle. However arrests, detentions or trials of clerics whose connection to jihad does not go beyond inspiration brings into question the West’s commitment to freedom of thought, something that Muslim governments have rarely upheld even before this particular struggle. We need to remember Muslim suspicions of our commitment to justice in the wake of Abu Ghraib, accusations about prisoner treatment at Guantanamo, and revelations of secret prisons.

What part of our new strategy makes sense, then? There may be no perfect strategy but rather only measures that suit particular situations. Certain local governments have explicitly or implicitly sought to separate moderates from radicals, or those who could be co-opted from the irredeemable. This strategy – narrowing the very broad field of potential enemies, has been attempted to some degree in Iraq where Islamist parties like SCIRI and al-Da`wa are now operating as legal, representative organizations, and an accord achieved with Muqtada al-Sadr and his followers essentially bounded their rebellion, allowing them a role in political life. The Egyptian government’s truce with radical Islamists forged in the wake of the 1997 Luxor attacks provided a truce to jihad there prior to the emergence of several new radical cells. [20] The Saudi authorities have tried to negotiate with militants through neo-salafists who forswore violence and cooperated by issuing amnesty calls. Yemen and Algeria provide other examples. Paying attention to these examples means more fully internationalizing the GWOT. And that implies granting more authority to ally nations, listening to their acquired knowledge, finding ways to improve cooperation and coordination with them, and establishing standards in counterterrorist efforts.

Dampening recruitment is another tricky aspect of this war. Recognizing the specificity of jihad’s attractions is essential.Young fighters, in particular, exhibit certain individual and organizational characteristics found in gang cultures. But do anti-gang tactics developed elsewhere in the world work in these instances? Would young recruits accept pay-offs? Probably not. Democratization and economic development are promoted as environmental solutions, but will require decades, not months. It is true that reconstruction and rehabilitation post-disaster as in Pakistan or Kashmir, or post-war as in Iraq, are part of the prevention of militant recruitment. In the short run, different efforts are necessary. Potential recruits need to understand the callousness of their leadership, and witness the lack of emotion in the testimony of would-be mujahida, Sajida Moubarak Atrous (al-Rashawi) whose husband detonated himself at the Radisson Hotel in Amman, and the way that she took so little responsibility for her own actions in her statement. Jihadists’ hypocrisy is all about rhetoric’s power versus communal affiliations. Since fighters use the term al-qa’idin (the sedentary folk) to ridicule and condemn those who won’t adopt jihad, sedentary folk need to battle back in their own way, re-establishing communal trust and diminishing the allure of jihadist’s symbology. This is just another instance of the internationalization of counterterrorist strategy that may do some good in the long war ahead.

Sherifa Zuhur is distinguished visiting professor of National Security Affairs at U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

Notes

1 The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

2. Husni Mubarak, Televised Speech, Egyptian Television, March 31, 2003; and “Egypt’s Mubarak Warns ‘100 Bin Ladens’ CBS News, March 31, 2003 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/31/world/main547033.shtml

3. “Toll Climbs in Egyptian Attacks,” BBC News, 23 July 2005 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4709491.stm

4. Sherifa Zuhur, “A New Phase for Jihad in Egypt,” in Unmasking Terror: A Global Review of Terrorist Activities. Vol. II, edited by Christopher Heffelfinger, Washington D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, 2005.

5. “Furious Jordanians Take to the Streets.” CNN. November 11, 2005. http://www.cnn.com; “Thousands of Jordanians Protest Amman Bombings,” National Public Radio, Nov. 11, 2005; http;//www.npr.org; “Zarqawi Defends Jordan Attacks,” BBC News 18 November, 2005, http://www.bbc.co.uk

6. “Who Profited from Amman Bombings? - Israelis Were Evacuated Hours Before the Attack.” Al-Jazeerah.com 11/15/2005 at http://www.aljazeera.com/cgi

7. “Zarqawi Defends Jordan Attacks,” BBC News 18 November, 2005, http://www.bbc.co.uk

8. Stephen Ulph, “Internal Jihadist Criticisms of the War in Iraq. Terrorism Focus, 9 Jan, 2006.

9. Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

10. Fariba Adelkhah, Being Modern in Iran. Trans. by Jonathan Derrick., New York: Columbia University Press, 2000; Sherifa Zuhur, Revealing Reveiling: Islamist Gender Ideology in Contemporary Egypt, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992.

11. Youssef Aboul-Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, Islamic Rulings on Warfare ( Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004) printed copies no longer available see www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ pdffiles/PUB588.pdf, pp. 15-16 and 18-21.

12. This does not however mean that all Wahhabis call for violent jihad. There remains a very active debate about the meaning of this duty. Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali and Muhammad Muhsin Khan,”The Call to Jihad in the Qur’an” Interpretation of the Holy Quran in the English Language: A Summarized Version of Al-Tabari, Al-Qurtubi and Ibn Kathir with Comments from Sahih-Bukhari, Summarized in One Volume. Riyadh: Dar al-Salam Publishers, 1994, pp. 1043-1064.

13. Hence the logic in Porter J. Goss, “Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long-Term Challenges with a Long-Term Strategy.” Testimony of the Director of Central Intelligence Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 16 February 2005.

14. International Education Central To U.S. Public Diplomacy, Says Panel,” NAFSA: Association of International Educators, 23 November 2005, http://www.nafsa.org/press_releases.sec/press_releases.pg/public_diplomacy_event_2

15. State of the Union (2005) Address. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-11.html

16. The Status of Muslim Civil Rights in the United States, 2005. Washington DC: Council on American-Islamic Relations, 2005.

17. For a list of many, though not all, militant attacks, and counterstrategies see: Sherifa Zuhur, A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of Counterinsurgency, Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005, or online http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/people.cfm?authorID=555

18. The Haaretz newspaper has used the word “assassination” instead of targeted eliminations for some years.

19. CNN interview with President Pervez Musharref, 11:34 a.m. Eastern Standard time aired November 13, 2005.

20. Zuhur, “A New Phase for Jihad?”