Catastrophic Disaster and the Future of the Military Response

By James Jay Carafano

Withering criticism of the federal response to Hurricane Katrina has prompted a close examination of what happened and why—as it should.  When one of the most destructive storms in U.S. history struck the Gulf Coast in the summer of 2005, it threatened millions of Americans in an area over 10,000 square miles. At the heart of the disaster, the city of New Orleans was virtually destroyed by the flooding that followed in the storm’s aftermath. It was, to put it mildly, a bad day for America. As one veteran responder put it, getting aid into New Orleans and other devastated areas after Hurricane Katrina hit was like “landing an army at Normandy with a little less shooting.”  And when Americans needed America most, we let them down.                                    

Assessing the Response

Pres­ident George W. Bush was abso­lutely correct in labeling the national response “inadequate.” When national catastrophes occur, the nation’s resources need to be mobilized to respond immediately. Equally important, Americans must remain confident that their leaders, at all levels of government, are in charge and doing the right things to make all Americans safer. On both counts, the nation fell short, and Americans have a right to understand why and what can be done better

An analysis of what went wrong has to focus on the nation’s capacity to respond to a cat­astrophic disaster. The current national response system is built on “tiered response,” a methodical employment of emergency responder assets very appropriate for dealing with disasters on a “normal” scale. In a tiered-response, local leaders turn to state resources when they are exhausted. In turn, states turn to Washington when their means are exceeded. Both must communicate their requirements to fed­eral officials and manage the response effectively.

In most disasters, local resources handle things in the first hours and days until national resources can be requested, marshaled, and rushed to the scene. Deploying national resources usually takes days. And usually that’s all right, because local and state responders are capable of both providing aid and instilling confidence until reinforcements arrive.

Catastrophic disasters are of a completely differ­ent character. State and local resources may well be exhausted from the onset, and government leaders may well be unable to determine or communicate their priority needs. In such a situation, national resources need to show up in hours, not days, in unprecedented amounts, regardless of the difficul­ties. The United States lacks the means and capabil­ities to do this. This is something that the nation still needs to build. 

Even years after Septem­ber 11, 2001, the U.S. has only begun to build the needed system. In part, this is because Congress, states, and cities wanted it this way. All of them insisted on doling out grants with scant regard to national priorities. Katrina shows why this piece­meal approach is wrong. Many of the New Orleans fire stations were buried under water, along with much of the equipment bought with federal dol­lars. Only a national system—capable of mustering the whole nation—can respond to catastrophic disasters.

The Military Response

Part of knowing what to fix, however, is knowing what not to fix in the national response system. And there were things that went right. America's military was a case in point.

When local and state assets are overwhelmed during a disaster, it is appropriate for military assets to be brought in to bridge the gap until civilian responders can handle the situation. And that did happen.

The U.S. Coast Guard, a uniformed military service that is now part of the Department of Homeland Security, rescued more than 33,000 people during and after the storm, often under harrowing conditions. And the Pentagon pitched in as well. By August 31, the Defense Department had started medical airlifts, and the USS Bataan had arrived off New Orleans. Almost 50,000 National Guard forces deployed to support hurricane relief, and active duty troops from the 82d Airborne and 1st Cavalry, more than 17,000, pitched in as well.

A second amphibious assault ship and an aircraft carrier arrived on September 6. Twenty ships, 360 helicopters and 93 fixed-wing aircraft were in the affected area by September 7. It was the largest and fastest deployment of U.S. military forces in support of a natural disaster in the nation's history.

Few in the media seemed to notice the difference they made. If the nation had really responded as ineptly as the press suggested, then the death toll would have been catastrophic. But it wasn't. Hundreds of thousands were evacuated before the storm, tens of thousands were rescued after it hit, and millions received aid, shelter and comfort in the storm's wake.

There are lessons to be learned from Katrina. At the outset of a disaster, when state and local governments are overwhelmed, and before the vast resources in the private sector can be brought to bear, there is an important role for "military" responders. They must, however, be organized, trained and equipped properly for the task, so that in cases like Katrina they can get there and make a difference in hours instead of days.

A good place to start would be to consider modernizing the Coast Guard. Today, young Coast Guard men and women are busier than ever. But they are heading into harm's way with a fleet of ships, planes and helicopters that are rapidly wearing out. Coast Guardsmen were deployed into the teeth of Katrina on ships old enough to collect Social Security. There's no excuse for that.

Before Katrina, the House voted to cut the Coast Guard's budget for new equipment. There's no excuse for that, either. Congress should double the amount given to the Coast Guard for new ships and aircraft, equipment that could have saved even more lives.

Congress and the administration also need to ensure that we have a robust, fully manned and well-equipped National Guard. And the Guard should have units organized and equipped to meet contingencies exactly like Katrina or any other large-scale disaster whether it is caused by a terrorist or a natural disaster. In achieving that end there are some things they should—and should not do.

The Military and the Law

The government response to Hurricane Katrina also renewed debate over the efficacy of the Posse Comi­tatus Act, which prohibits the Pentagon from con­ducting domestic law enforcement. Amending the law to grant federal troops greater authority in restor­ing order in the wake of a domestic emergency is a bad idea. Establishing ways to ensure that the mili­tary is better prepared to respond to disasters makes sense, but chang­ing Posse Comitatus would be a mistake.

Under the Posse Comitatus Act, the armed services are generally prohibited from engaging in law enforcement activ­ities inside the United States, such as investigating, arresting, or incarcerating individuals, except as authorized by federal law. The National Guard, however, enjoys a unique legal status. Guard troops are frequently referred to as citizen soldiers, part of the military’s substantial Reserve components. Reserve forces are called to active service only for limited periods, such as for annual training or over­seas deployments. When not on active duty, National Guard units remain on call to support the governors of their respective states. Posse Comita­tus does not apply to National Guard forces unless they are mobilized as federal troops. As a result, the Guard plays the primary role in augmenting state and local law enforcement under state control, while the Defense Department plays a supporting role, providing resources and logistical support.

Furthermore, the Posse Comita­tus Act has never been a serious obstacle to using federal forces to support domestic operations. For example, federal forces helped to quell riots by miners in Idaho in 1899; protected James Meredith, the University of Mississippi’s first black student, in 1961; assisted in controlling the 1992 Los Angeles riots; and helped to reestablish order in the aftermath of Hurricane Kat­rina. In fact, federal forces have been used to enforce laws over 175 times in the past 200 years under the authority of laws such as the Insurrection Act. In short, the federal troops can be there when they are needed.

Undercutting or supplanting the authority of mayors and governors in a moment of national crisis would be a monumental mistake. Rather than tinkering with constitutional relationships, Congress and the administration should focus on creating mechanisms to get them the forces they will need to get the job done. The greatest obstacle to overcome is not the legal barriers, but the tyranny of time and distance and the destroyed infrastructure, such as downed bridges and flooded roads, which might limit access.

Deploying the military faster—making it a more agile and flexible instrument to respond to all kinds of domestic security needs—is a question of force structure and policy. It does not require tampering with the sovereign responsibilities outlined in the Constitution. There are better solutions. Specifi­cally, Congress could.

• Mix National Guard and Reserve forces. The Army Reserves, like the National Guard, are cit­izen soldiers. However, the Reserves are federal forces, meaning that they do not belong to the states in which they are based. Since assets indis­pensable to disaster relief are scattered through­out the Reserve components (both the Reserves and the Guard), disaster relief efforts should integrate both components’ resources and clarify lines of authority in a manner that preserves states’ autonomy in accordance with Posse Com­itatus. Rather than amend the law to expand fed­eral authority, Congress could consider adding a provision that would allow federal Reserve units to function under state control during a natural disaster or other emergency situation. Under such a provision, states could draft their own emergency response plans and submit them to the Department of Defense (DOD) and Depart­ment of Homeland Security (DHS). In an emer­gency, the DOD could then marshal the resources and logistical support necessary to support state authorities. Such an arrangement allows states to tailor plans to their individual needs, to maintain unity and continuity of com­mand, and to allow for coordinating the needs and costs of responding to disasters and other contingencies before the event.
   
• Create a Navy National Guard. The emerging potential for maritime threats and low-altitude attacks augurs the need for an organizational structure that better utilizes the Navy’s capacity to support homeland security. Several states with maritime interests already have state naval militias. In fact, the New York Naval Militia assisted in the response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Creating a Navy Guard to include all coastal states would offer several advantages. A Navy Guard would provide coastal states with more resources to address their state maritime security and public safety requirements. Unlike the Coast Guard, the Navy Guard would focus on state needs when not on active federal service. It would also pro­vide an organization within the National Guard and the Navy that treats homeland security missions as an inherent responsibility and would work to develop the requisite competen­cies and capabilities to fully support these tasks. Finally, a Navy Guard would provide a suitable partner for the U.S. Coast Guard to ensure seamless integration of daily DOD and DHS maritime operations.

The National Guard and Homeland Security

The most important innovation that could be made to improve the military response to catastrophic disaster would be reorganize and equip a significant portion of the National Guard so that they are well prepared to perform “consequence management” missions both at home and overseas.

Most disasters, including terrorist attacks, can be handled by emergency responders. Only catastrophic disasters—events that overwhelm the capacity of state and local governments— require a large-scale military response. Assigning this mission to the military makes sense. It would be counterproductive and ruinously expensive for other federal agencies, local governments, or the private sector to maintain the excess capacity and resources needed for immediate catastrophic response. On the other hand, maintaining this capacity would have real utility for the military. The Pentagon could use response forces for tasks directly related to its primary warfighting jobs—such as theater support to civilian governments during a conflict, counterinsurgency missions, and postwar occupation—as well as homeland security. Furthermore, using military forces for catastrophic response would be in accordance with constitutional principles and would not require changing existing laws.

These forces would be National Guard soldiers, which are the troops that have the flexibility to work equally well under state or federal control. The force needs to be large enough to maintain some units on active duty at all times for rapid response and sufficient to support missions at home and abroad. For catastrophic response, three components would need to be particularly robust: medical, security, and critical infrastructure response. In addition, the force must be self-deployable by air and logistically self-sustaining.

State Response Forces

States should also remember that they have other military assets available to them besides the National Guard and active duty military forces. U.S. law allows states to raise and maintain state defense forces (SDF). As the emergency response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, these groups can be an important supplement to the National Guard, particularly during catastrophic disasters. When trained, disciplined, and well organized, local responders are essential for providing immediate aid and security. Congress and the Bush Administration should encourage states to better organize, train, and equip these volunteer units.

The U.S. Constitution and United States Code Title 32, Section 309, authorize state defense forces. An SDF is under the command of the governor and reports to the state's Adjutant General. The state's constitution and laws prescribe the SDF's duties and responsibilities. These forces are state troops and are not funded by the federal government. In order to use armories, train on military installations, and receive in-kind support, states have to comply with federal standards for the National Guard in matters of accession, training, uniforms, and discipline. SDF personnel receive no pay for training but may be paid for active duty under state control.

Several states formed SDF units during World War I to replace their National Guard, which had been called into federal active duty. About 100,000 armed SDF personnel guarded key infrastructure and secured the coastlines and land frontiers. During World War II, about 200,000 state guardsmen, with War Department support, replaced the mobilized National Guard. The SDF program was revived in 1980 during the Cold War under the premise that SDF personnel would have to replace the National Guard on the home front if troops were mobilized to fight in Europe. Currently, 23 states maintain state defense forces of some kind, for a nationwide total of about 14,000 personnel.

Thousands of SDF personnel from at least eight states participated in the response to Hurricane Katrina. Louisiana activated all of its SDF. About 150 of these personnel were used in the response operation in support of the Louisiana National Guard. Mississippi also activated all of its State Guard personnel, principally in support of the Army National Guard, to provide security and operate shelters. Under the direction of the Adjutant General, Alabama SDF personnel assisted in providing security and supported the operations of the Alabama National Guard.

Although most SDF personnel were used in their own states, some were also deployed to the Gulf Coast. The Texas State Guard activated over 1,000 members on paid active duty. Medical and military police units received evacuees at Kelly Air Force Base and supported operations at the Houston Astrodome and at shelters in four other locations within Texas. Georgia SDF personnel were activated in unpaid status to process evacuees through Dobbins Air Reserve Base and to provide medical and administrative support and security for shelters. Virginia used about 100 unpaid volunteers as part of the Katrina response operation. This allowed additional members of the Virginia National Guard to deploy to the Gulf Coast. Members of the Virginia defense force assisted in the deployment of National Guard units and provided security for armories. The Maryland defense force sent an 81-person medical team to Louisiana. The Tennessee State Guard was alerted on September 1 and activated 150 volunteers to secure and support shelter operations at several locations.

Although governors have great responsibility for preparedness and response in catastrophic emergencies, they have few resources other than their National Guard available to them. SDF provide a low-cost way for states to increase the resources available. However, they have received little attention. Some state Adjutants General want strong and effective SDF under their command as part of their state military departments. Others resist having SDF, in some cases because of the additional work necessary to administer them. Historically, the Pentagon has offered little support or advice to the states. Additionally, while the Department of Homeland Security promotes volunteer participation in national preparedness and response programs, it has paid scant attention to SDF.

Neglecting SDF is a mistake. With National Guard forces being called to active duty more frequently than at any time since the Korean War, the need for SDF to provide some measure of backup support to the states should be readily apparent. SDF should be a core part of the volunteer assets available to states in time of crisis. Congress can help by establishing a legislative framework to require appropriate cooperation between the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security and the state governments on SDF matters.

A Better Way

Congress and the Administration can do better than changing laws like Posse Comitatus that safeguard the liberties of U.S. citizens, the principles of federalism, and the bal­ance of civil–military relations. Rather, our leaders in Washington should improve integration of the Guard Reserve, create a Navy Guard, reorganize part of the National Guard for new mis­sions, and encourage governors to improve their State Defense Forces. These steps will make the nation better pre­pared for the next Katrina.

Dr. James Jay Carafano is Senior Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, The Heritage Foundation